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DESPITE the modem bank's diverse functions, its assets are still treated by the
laws of a few states' as a single homogeneous fund in which all of its customers
may share alike in the event of insolvency. But the legislatures and courts of
most states have felt that particular assets or amounts of assets should be held
for the prior protection of the customers of one or another of the bank's differ-
ent departments. In these states the determination of which assets should be
held for the security of which creditors, and of the extent to which one class of
the bank's customers should be preferred over another or allowed to participate
in assets derived from transactions with that other, has given rise to a mul-
titude of problems. The great dissimilarity which characterizes the various
legislative and judicial solutions of these problems bears witness to the influence
of many economic, social and legal policies.
1. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado and Tennessee. Even in these states, of course,




Special protection for savings depositors is founded principally upon the.
view that they are typically persons of small means, ill-fitted to bear the loss
occasioned by a bank's insolvency,2 and possibly also upon the alleged belief of
the average savings depositor that the money he deposits remains his own pro-
perty, free from the risks attendant upon the operation of the commercial or
trust departments. 3 Fourteen jurisdictions, classing all savings depositors to-
gether,4 accord them a priority5 in the assets identifiable as those acquired
through the operations of the savings department.6 Such assets, which are
2. In re Prudential Trust Co., 240 Mass. 478, 482, 134 N. E. 253, 254 (1922); Reichert
v. Farmers' & Workingmen's Bank, 257 Mich. 500, 505, 242 N. W. 239, 241 (1932).
3. REP. SPECIAL Coi IassioN oiq REvisio" OF LAWS RELATING TO . . . LIQUIDATION or
BANKs (Mass. 1932) 31.
4. Christmas savings dub members are ranked as savings depositors in Connecticut
and Massachusetts. Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., 88 Conn. 15, 90 Atl. 369
(1914); In re Hanover Trust Co., 242 Mass. 343, 136 N. E. 112 (1922).
5. This priority is not necessarily the highest given to any claimant. The word priority
is used herein to describe the relative status of the claims of the ordinary savings depoitor,
commercial depositor, and cestui que trust. The claims of these broad classes are often
inferior to those of smaller subclasses of special creditors, who enjoy every conceivable level
of priority in the different states. Expenses of liquidation: MONT. REV. CODE (Choate, Supp.
1927) § 6014.134 (prior to all other claims); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 218c-14
(prior to all except wage and tax liens) ; I; re Prudential, Cosmopolitan and Hanover Trust
Cos., 244 Mass. 64, 138 N. E. 702 (1923) (prior to all except savings depositors). Pub-
lic deposits: MI=N. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 7715 (priority above all); State v. Farmers'
Exchange Bank of Gallatin, 56 S. W. (2d) 129 (Mo. 1932) (pari passu with all other
preferred creditors); MONT. REv. CODE (Choate, Supp. 1927) § 6014.134 (pari passu with
all depositors and contract creditors); Ga. Laws 1927, p. 199 (inferior to depositors);
Note (1932) 41 YALE L.J.432. Deposits of liquidators of insolvent banks: Wis. STAT. (1931)
§ 220.08 (7) (prior to any other deposits) ; Ore. Laws 1931, c. 278, § 30 (priority on equality
with any other priority). Deposits of savings banks in other banks: fMTN. STAT. (Mason,
1927) § 7715 (prior to all except government deposits); N. Y. BANKING LAW (1914) §§ 278,
414 (pari passu with all other preferred claims). Laborers' liens and wages: N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) § 218(c) (14) (higher than everything except taxes); MD. ANN. CODE
(Bagby, 1924) art. 11, § 48 (inferior to fiduciary liabilities). Taxes: N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) § 218(c) (14) (nothing higher); Shippee v. Riverside Trust Co., 113
Conn. 661, 156 AtI. 43 (1931) (partly ahead of and partly behind savings depositors).
Collection items: IowA CODE (1931) § 9239-cl (first priority in all the assets of the
bank); Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, No. 240, § 13; Reichert v. Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 261 Mich.
107, 245 N. W. 808 (1932) (first priority, but only in assets of own department); MONT.
RLv. CODE (Choate, Supp. 1927) § 6014.134 (pari passu with depositors) ; In re Claim of Ot-
tumwa National Bank, 91 Pa. Super. 495 (1927) (inferior to depositors); Note (1932) 41
YALE L. J. 432. Certified and cashier's checks: N. C. CODE (Michie, 1931) § 218 (c) (14)
(higher than depositors; lower than wage and tax liens) ; Ore. Laws 1931, c. 278, § 27 (pani
passu with depositors). Judgment liens secured prior to bank's failure: Guaranty Fund
Commission v. Teichmeier, 119 Neb. 387, 229 N. W. 121 (1930) -(prior to everything).
6. CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act 652, § 27; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 3908;
Hawaii Sess. Laws 1931, Act 177, §§ 71, 120; IDAHO CODE (1932) § 25-1407 (applies only
to trust companies which do no commercial banking business); ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 57,
§§ 89, 90; MASS. ANN. LAWS (Michie, 1932) c. 172, § 62; McH. Comm. LAWS (1929)
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required to be segregated, include not only the securities purchased with the
money obtained from the savings depositors, but also the securities and paper ac-
quired by the commercial department and transferred for value to the savings
department,7 and those assets required in some states to be set aside out of
profits as a guaranty fund for savings depositors. 8 In addition to this protection,
a few states require that a portion of the capital stock and surplus be allocated
to the savings department as if it were a separate bank.9 The effect of such a
provision upon savings depositors in the event of the bank's insolvency is not
clear; but it would appear to give them a first claim upon the assets which, at
the time of the allocation, represented the portion of capital stock and surplus
allotted to the savings department.10 The allocation of capital stock, more-
over, usually carries with it a priority in a corresponding portion of the money
derived from the enforcement of stockholders' liability.1
§ 11928; MiNN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 7667; N. H. LAWS 1929, c. 37, § 1; ORE. CoDE
ANix. (1930) § 22-2004; R. I. Gnu. LAWS (1923) c. 272, § 1, cl. XVI-a; TEX. R v. Civ.
CODE (Vernon, 1928) art. 430, 433; WAsH. R v. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 1933) §§ 3244-1,
3246; Wyo. R~v. STAT. (1931) § 10-130. Some of these statutes have been interpreted.
Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., supra note 4; Glidden v. Pines, 124 Me. 286,
128 Atl. 4 (1925); In re Prudential Trust Co.; Reichert v. Farmers' and Workingmen's
Bank, both supra note 2; Bank Commissioners v. Security Trust Co., 75 N. H. 107, 71 Atl.
377 (1908).
7. Bieringer-Hanauer Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 247 Mass. 73, 141 N. E. 566
(1923); Dole v. Chattabriga, 82 N. H. 396, 134 Atl. 347 (1926). But the income on the
savings department assets is not included. Bassett v. Merchants' Trust Co., 115 Conn. 364,
161 AtI. 785 (1932). Nor are assets transferred from the commercial department without
payment of value included. Ibid.
8. MAss. AsN. LAWS (Michie, 1932) c. 172, § 64 (5% of deposits); N. H. PUB. LAWS
(1926) c. 261, § 18; N. H. Laws 1929 c. 37, § 1 (5% to 10% of deposits); R. I. Gm;.
LAWS (1923) § 4035 (5% of deposits).
9. CAL. Gmz. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 652, § 23; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 22-524;
WAsH. REv. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 1933) § 3244-1. In Michigan a portion of capital
and surplus is required to be allocated jointly to the commercial and savings departments.
MIcir. CowT. LAWS (1929) § 12019.
10. The statutory mandate to treat the divided capital stock and surplus "as if each
department was a separate bank" could not be literally obeyed without keeping separate
books for each department. In order that such books might balance, each department
would have to receive an amount of assets corresponding to the amount of capital and sur-
plus so allocated. The assets thus received by the savings department would presumably
become subject to the segregation requirement and to the savings depositors' priority.
Massachusetts gives savings depositors equal priority with cestuis que trustent in the
bank's entire "capital stock." MAss. ANx. LAWS (Michie, 1932) c. 172, §§ 55, 63. This is
defined as the money paid by the original stock subscribers. In re Prudential, Cosmopol-
itan and Hanover Trust Cos., supra note 5. As to the difficulties raised by such an inter-
pretation, see notes 46 and 47, infra.
11. The requirement that the capital stock allocated to each department be treated as if
each department were a separate bank would appear to confer such priority. Reichert v.
Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., supra note 5, in effect overruling Reichert v. Farmers' &
Workingmen's Bank, supra note 2. Except in Washington, where stockholders' liability
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Access to assets derived by the bank from the operations of the commercial
or trust department is accorded savings depositors upon varying terms. Such
depositors are given what amounts to a priority in the commercial department
assets when they are allowed to set off commercial department loans against
savings accounts; similar inter-department set-offs, with resulting priorities in
the savings assets, are usually denied to commercial depositors.12  Ordinarily,
however, savings depositors may share in the general assets of the other de-
partments 3 only as general creditors 14 and only in accordance with the so-called
"bankruptcy rule," which permits them to prove on the basis of the balance of
their claims.Y The few courts that have considered application of the alterna-
tive "equity rule," which would permit the savings depositors to prove in the
general assets on the basis of their full claims,16 have concluded that the adop-
tion of this rule would imperil the usual security afforded commercial depos-
itors,'7 or would constitute a greater departure from the general statutory re-
quirement of ratable distribution of assets than the language of the priority
statute demands.' 8 The claim which savings depositors may assert upon the
assets of other departments stands on a different footing, however, when the
statute requiring segregation therefrom of the savings assets has not been
is prepaid. WAsH. REV. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 1933) § 3229-2. Stockholders' liability
in Massachusetts follows the capital stock. MASS. ANN. LAws (Michie, 1932) c. 172, § 63.
It re Prudential, Cosmopolitan and Hanover Trust Cos., supra note 5.
12. The problem of priority for savings depositors through inter-department set-offs has
been developed elsewhere. Moore and Sussman, Current Account and Set-Offs between
Insolvent Bank and its Customers (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1109, at 1130; Note (1932) 32 CoL.
L. Rnv. 1224, 1229; (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 143.
13. "General assets" is here used to include assets in which no individual creditor, class
of creditors, or department has been given priority, and also all assets remaining after such
priorities, if given, have been satisfied. Identifiable trust funds are not regarded as assets
of the trust department. See notes 41 and 67, infra.
14. ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 57, § 90; MAss. ANw. LAws (Michie, 1932) c. 172, § 63;
In re Cosmopolitan, Hanover and Prudential Trust Cos., supra note 5; Bank Commission-
ers v. Security Trust Co., supra note 6. In Connecticut, however, they enjoy joint priority
with commercial depositors, second only to the possible priority of cestuis of court trusts
(see notes 42 and 53, infra). CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §§ 3885, 3935; Lippitt v. Thames
Loan and Trust Co., supra note 4. In Hawaii and Oregon, savings depositors have a priority
in commercial department assets after commercial depositors have been paid in full. Hawaii
Sess. Laws 1931, Act 177, § 119; OR. CODE ANN. (1930) § 22-2003.
15. See first two statutes and cases, supra note 14. In Michigan savings depositors
share in the general assets on the basis of their full claims, but only after all other creditors
have been paid as large a percentage of their claims as the savings depositors have realized
by virtue of their priority in savings department assets. Reichert v. Farmers' & Work-
ingmen's Bank, supra note 2; (1932) 30 Micir. L. Rav. 1334.
16. For a critical discussion of the bankruptcy and equity rules, see Note (1924) 8
M m. L. REv. 232; In re Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of Imperial, 292 Pac. 665 (Cal. App.
1930).
17. In re Cosmopolitan, Hanover and Prudential Trust Cos., 241 Mass. 346, 353, 136 N. E.
269, 271 (1922).
18. Reichert v. Farmers' & Workingmen's Bank, supra note 2.
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observed. At the very least, the savings depositors in such event may attempt
to "trace" the savings department assets into the general mass and so to recov-
er them as funds impressed with a trust because of the illegality of the ming-
ling.19 But since the success of "tracing" too often depends upon the fortui-
tous ebb and flow of credit transactions, 20 some states further shield savings de-
positors from financial misfortune by giving the savings department an abso-
lute priority in all the assets of the bank to the extent that savings department
assets were mingled therein.
21
Commercial depositors have not ordinarily been accorded special favors. Al-
though it may be argued that commercial deposits are the business enterprisers'
liquid assets, loss of which would interfere with industry and commerce, and
although legislative efforts to lure depositors from national banks might be
expected to make such provisions more general,22 only three jurisdictions have
given commercial depositors a priority in the assets resulting from the opera-
tion of their own department. 23 Of these three states, two have required a por-
-tion of the capital stock and surplus to be allocated to the commercial depart-
ment, so that that department, like the savings department, might be treated
as if it were a separately capitalized bank; 24 these two states thus probably con-
fer upon commercial depositors a priority in the assets which represented their
share of capital and surplus at the time of allocation.2 5  Moreover, two of the
three allow the commercial depositors a prior claim upon the crumbs from the
table of the savings depositors after the latter have fully satisfied themselves
19. Peters v. Union Trust Co., 131 Mich. 322, 91 N. W. 273 (1902).
20. For more detailed discussion of tracing theories and presumptions see notes 56-64,
infra.
21. N. D. Laws 1931, c. 96, § 48 a-c, e (enjoyed only by "Secured Savings Deposits,"
limited to $500 principal and 2%% interest). A Massachusetts case, fit re Prudential
Trust Co., supra note 2, accomplishes the same result by invoking a segregation statute,
MASS. ArN. LAWS (Michie, 1932) c. 167, § 42, which is practically identical with Mxcn.
Comp. LAWS (1929) § 11928, in force when the Peters case, supra note 19, was decided.
The other statutes listed, supra note 6, which are very similar to these two statutes, have
not yet received interpretation on this point.
22. Cf. Editor's comment, Omo GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1933) p. 53 (§ 710-31); Com-
ment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 454, 458.
23. CAL. Gmr. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 652, §§ 26, 27; Hawaii Sess. Laws 1931, Act
177, § 119; ORE. CODE ATNH. (1930) § 22-2003. The recency of these statutes suggests a
trend in favor of such priorities. A similar statute for Massachusetts has been recom-
mended, chiefly on the ground that neither savings depositors nor commercial depositors ex-
pect that the former will be allowed to share in the assets of the commercial department.
REP. SPEcIL Co-AxnssioN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 31, 92.
In distributing commercial department assets Michigan gives commercial depositors priority
over all general creditors, including general creditors of the trust department, except that
their priority over savings depositors terminates when they have received as large a per-
centage of their claims as the savings depositors have realized from the savings depart-
ment assets. Reichert v. Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., supra note 5; Reichert v. Farmers' &
Workingmen's Bank, supra note 2; cf. note 15, supra.
24. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 652, § 23; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 22-524.
25. See note 10, supra.
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from the savings department assets.26 A small number of states have classed
commercial and savings depositors together. On the theory that special pro-
tection for all depositors is desirable to help prevent runs, 27 and to induce de-
positors to supply the funds without which banks and industry could not existY2
these states have bestowed upon them a priority in all of the assets of the
bank,2 9 including, in some instances, the sums derived from enforcement of
the stockholders' liability.30 Two other states give depositors a preference in
the joint assets of the commercial and savings departments and require that
a portion of capital stock be allotted jointly to those departments to be "held
solely for the repayment of depositors."3' 1 Since capital stock as such is not an
asset, the exact nature of the priority thus conferred is left undefined.
3 2
A modern bank assumes the duties and obligations of a trustee under a wide
variety of circumstances. Its trust funds include not only those held by its
trust department by the appointment of a court33 or of a private deed of
trust,34 but also those designated "deposits for a special purpose," which are
handled by the commercial department; 35 and between these extremes various
kinds of trust moneys are to be found, cared for sometimes in one department
26. Hawaii Sess. Laws 1931, Act. 177, § 120; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 22-2004.
27. Cf. State v. Farmers' State Bank of Polk, 121 Neb. 547, 549, 237 N. W. 862, 863
(1931).
28. State v. Coming State Savings Bank, 127 Iowa 198, 204, 103 N. W. 97, 99 (1905);
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.'s Appeal, 310 Pa. 17, 24, 164 Atl. 715, 717 (1932).
29. Ga. Laws 1927, p. 199; IowA CODE (1931) § 9239; Miss. Code (Harrison, Supp.
1933) § 3847-3; NEB. CoMP. STAT. (1929) § 8-1102 (unsecured depositors only); PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 7, § 483. These statutes have been interpreted in State v. Corning
State Savings Bank, supra note 28; Guaranty Fund Commission v. Teichmeier, supra note
5; Commonwealth v. American Trust Co., 39 Pa. Cy. 469 (1912).
30. GA. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 2366 (71); NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) § 8-1102; Town of
Douglasville v. Mobley, 169 Ga. 53, 149 S. E. 575 (1929). Contra: IowA CODE (1931)
§ 9254 (all creditors share equally). In South Carolina, depositors have priority in stock-
holders' liability although they have none in the assets of the bank. S. C. CoNsT. (1895) art.
9, § 18; S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 7855-6; Biltrite Building Co. v. Elliott, 166 S. C. 534,
165 S. E. 340 (1932).
31. Omio ANN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 710-168; OxRA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) § 9233 (in-
cludes a corresponding portion of stockholders' liability).
32. The priority here conferred may be the same as that resulting from the allocation
of capital stock among departments as if each department were a "separate bank." Cf. note
10, supra. Or it may operate upon all the assets of the bank to an amount equal to the
portion of capital stock allocated to those departments. Cf. note 47, infra.
33. These are the so-called "court trusts," as distinguished from all kinds of trusts
created by private persons or by the automatic operation of law. Trusts executed under the
appointment of wills are also usually classed as court trusts. People v. California Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 22 Cal. App. 69, 133 Pac. 324 (1913).
34. These are known as "living trusts" or "voluntary trusts." Hmarc, TRUST DEPART-
:MENTS IN BANKs AND TRUST ComANm S (1925) 14.
35. These are often referred to as "trust" funds and treated as such by the courts.
E.g., Townsend v. Athelstan Bank, 212 Iowa 1078, 237 N. W. 356 (1931); In re Central
Bank & Trust Co. v. Ritchie, 120 Wash. 160, 206 Pac. 926 (1922). Strictly they are not,
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and sometimes in another.36 Accordingly, most of the states which grant spe-
cial protection to cestuis que trustent carry it beyond the limits of the trust de-
partment.37 Despite the prevalence of the trust as a business device, benefi-
ciaries of all of these trusts have profited from the familiar dogma of equity
that cestuis que trustent are persons economically weak and peculiarly in need
of protection; 38 although perhaps an equally important explanation of the
favoritism shown them lies in state efforts to attract remunerative trust business
away from the national banks.39 Many legislatures have enacted statutes de-
claring that trust funds shall not be liable for the debts of the bank,
4 o thus
for the parties expect the bank to mingle the funds with its general assets and use them
in its business as its own. TRuSTs RFSTATEET (Am. L. Inst., 1930) Prelim. Draft No. 1,
§ 15 h; Note (1928) 13 CoRN. L. Q. 603; Note (1933) 18 CoRN. L. Q. 423, 425.
Certain other deposits in the commercial department may become the subject of a
trust ex maleficio by automatic operation of law. For example, cf. First National Bank
of Forsyth v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 48 F. (2d) 585 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931) (public funds
deposited without the security required by law); School District No. 62 v. Schramm,
20 P. (2d) 241 (Ore. 1933) (deposit accepted when the officers of the bank knew that it
was insolvent); Round Prairie Bank of Fillmore v. Downey, 64 S. W. (2d) 701 (Mo. 1933)
(deposit by person known by the bank to be unauthorized or legally incompetent).
36. These are funds handled under what may more properly be regarded as agency
contracts. AGENcy RESTATMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1933) §§ 72e, 425a. With respect to such
funds, however, the bank is often denominated "trustee" by the courts, and treated as such
in the event of insolvency. E.g., Myers v. Matusek, 98 Fla. 1126, 125 So. 360 (1929)
(money invested for customer by trust department); Asheville Safe Deposit Co. v. Hood,
204 N. C. 346, 168 S. E. 524 (1933) (interest collected by trust department); Leach
v. Iowa State Bank of Sioux City, 204 Iowa 497, 212 N. W. 748 (1927) (interest col-
lected by commercial department); Parker v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 202 N. C.
230, 162 S. E. 564 (1932) (escrow in trust department); Newsom v. Acacia Mutual Life
Association, 102 Fla. 567, 136 So. 389 (1931) (escrow in commercial department). HE=ucY,
op. cit. supra note 34, at 15.
37. The typical statute provides security for "all the funds held in trust": IoDao CODE
(1932) § 25-915; MOiNr. REv. CODE (Choate, Supp. 1927) § 6014.134; or for "the faithful
performance of the duties undertaken in respect to any trust"; OHIo GEN. CODE (Page,
1926) § 710-161. judicial interpretations are sparce; however, the Idaho statute has been
held to include a trust ex maleficio in the commercial department, White v. Pioneer Bank
& Trust Co., 50 Idaho 589, 298 Pac. 933 (1931); and a deposit of funds for a special
purpose, Skinner v. Porter, 45 Idaho 530, 263 Pac. 993 (1928). Customers who have
dealt with the commercial department, however, have more difficulty in establishing their
right to be regarded as cestuis. Pacific State Savings & Loan Co. v. Commercial State
Bank, 46 Idaho 481, 269 Pac. 86 (1928); Reichert v. State Bank of Beavertown, 262 Mich.
157, 247 N. W. 139 (1933). But even trust department customers are not always regarded
as cestuis. J. G. Kuehnle Co. v. Fulton, 45 Ohio App. 386, 187 N. E. 81 (1932). Only
two states confer priority which is coterminus with trust departments limits. CAL. GEN.
LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act. 652, §§ 23, 27; MIcH. Com. LAWS (1929) § 11901, p. 4205.
Thus, these statutes do not protect trusts ex maleficio. Reichert v. Fidelity Bank & Trust
Co., supra note 5.
38. Hsmmicx, op. cit. supra note 34, at 18.
39. See note 22, supra.
40. Del. Laws 1933, c. 93, § 23, c. 94, § 23; FLA. Comzi'. LAws (Harrison, 1927) § 6127;
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reaffirming the cestui's right, long recognized in equity, to reclaim any assets
specifically identified as belonging to his estate.4' If no assets are thus identi-
fiable because the bank has mingled them with its own, contrary to law or to
the express terms of the trust, or if the assets thus identified have depreciated
through dereliction on the part of the bank, some states permit the cestui to
recoup his loss by asserting a priority against all the assets of the bank.
42
Security for the faithful performance of the bank's trust duties is also sought
by other devices. A few jurisdictions allow trust beneficiaries a first claim upon
the assets of the trust department, 43 which, like the savings and commercial de-
partments, is for bookkeeping purposes treated by those states as a separate
bank.44 A number of statutes, though not treating the operations and assets of
the various departments as if they were those of separately capitalized banks,
nevertheless set aside the "capital stock" of the bank as special security for
claims of cestuis.45 Since capital stock is not an asset, these statutes are ex-
IOWA CODE (1931) § 9290; ME. REV. STAr. (1930) c. 57, § 75; MASs. Am. LAWS (Michie,
1933) c. 172, § 54; 11 Mo. STAT. A.-. (Vernon and West, 1932) § 5423-8; OKLA. STAT.
(Harlow, 1931) § 9208; Philippine Laws 1929, Act. 3610, § 141; S. C. Cxv. CODE (Michie,
1932) § 7887 (4); Vt. Pub. Acts 1933, No. 124, § 10; W. VA. CODE (1931) § 31-4-10;
Wyo. REv. STAT. (Courtright, 1931) § 10-403, 18th. The same result is produced by
statutes giving "all funds held in trust" priority over all depositors, IDAHO CODE (1932)
§ 25-915; MONT. REv. CODE (Choate, Supp. 1927) § 6014.134.
41. State v. Farmers' State Bank of Polk, 121 Neb. 532, 237 N. W. 857 (1931).
42. Ind. Laws 1931, c. 167, § 1; Md. Laws 1933, c. 546, § 1, amending MD. ANN. CODE
(Bagby, 1924) art. 11, § 48; R. I. Gzr. LAWS (1923) § 3995 (to the extent of the par
value of the capital stock; savings department assets exempted from this priority); D. C.
CODE (1929) tit. 5, §§ 351, 372 [unless D. C. Acts. 1933, No. 434, extending the 'provisions
of 13 STAT. 115 (1864), 12 U. S. C. § 194 (1916) to the District of Columbia, effected its
repeal. This latter federal statute has been interpreted by the federal courts as forbidding
the giving of any priorities. Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S. 275 (1896). Similar
provisions of state statutes, however, have not been deemed inconsistent with special pro-
tection for cestuis or savings depositors. Cf. CorN. Gm. STAT. (1930) § 3935, with id.
§§ 3908, 3885; and cf. Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 165a-17 (c), with id. § 614]; W. VA.
CODE (1931) § 31-4-12; possibly also CONN. Gm. STAT. (1930) § 3885 (probably limited
in operation to court trusts); possibly also MONT. REv. CODE (Choate, Supp. 1927) §
6014.134. A similar statute in Idaho has been interpreted as giving no priority without
tracing. Skinner v. Porter, supra note 37.
43. CAL. GmT. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 652, §§ 23, 27; MicH. ComT. LAWS (1929)
§ 12019; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 22-524 (by implication only). The priority conferred
carries with it a correlative disadvantage; cestuis cannot share in the assets of the other
departments unless there is an overplus remaining after payment of the creditors of those
departments (or unless the trust funds can be traced into those assets; see note 56, infra).
Cf. Russ Lumber Co. v. Hellman Commercial Bank, 22 P. (2d) 234 (Cal. 1933).
44. See note 10, supra.
45. Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 612a; MAss. ANx. LAWS (Michie, 1932) c. 172, § 55
(priority on a par with savings depositors); Orno ANN. CODE (Page, 1926) §§ 710-161,
710-168; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1933) tit. 7, §§ 819-2, 819-1106, (if the words:
"shall be considered as the security required by law . . . and shall be absolutely liable . .
confer a priority) ; S. C. Civ. CODE (1932) § 7865.
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ceedingly ambiguous. If their reference is to the assets derived from the stock-
holders' original contributions, the protection they afford to cestuis is largely
illusory, since identification of such assets is ordinarily impossible.40  These
statutes have real meaning, however, if they are construed as giving cestuis a
priority in all the assets of the bank to an amount equal to the par value of the
capital stock.4 ' Moreover, priority in funds realized from enforcement of the
stockholders' liability frequently accompanies and lends substance to grants of
"capital stock" as security for trust claimants.48  Many jurisdictions give
cestius prior access to special guaranty funds required to be set aside or
deposited with the superintendent of banks.49
In many states in which corporate fiduciaries have been exempted from fur-
nishing the bond exacted of individuals acting in the same capacities,r ° the
dignity of the court apparently requires that funds upon which the judicial
benediction has been pronounced be held especially inviolable.0 1 Accordingly,
cesuis of court trusts are accorded a priority in special guaranty funds52 which
must be set aside or deposited with the superintendent of banks for their ben-
46. Yet this is the interpretation adopted in Massachusetts. In re Prudential, Cosmo-
politan and Hanover Trust Cos., supra note S.
47. This construction has been adopted in Kentucky. Ohio Valley Bank & Trust Co.
v. Pettit's Trustee, 206 Ky. 818, 268 S. W. 535 (1925).
48. See statutes of California, Massachusetts, and Ohio, loc. cit. supra notes 43 and 45.
Contra: S. C. CoNs?. (1895) art. 9, § 18; Er parte Michie, 167 S. C. 1, 9, 165 S. E.
359, 362 (1932) (silent concurrence of supreme court in ruling by district judge on this
point).
49. Cg. Gz~r. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act 652, § 96 ($50,000 to $100,000, according to
population); FLA. Comop. LAws (1927) § 6126 (14) ($10,000); AT=. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§ 7662 (25% to 50% of capital stock) ; 11 Mo. STAT. AN-. (1932) §§ 5424, 5425 (as direc-
tors may see fit); N. Y. BAnm LAW (1914) §§ 105, 184 (10% of capital stock); OHIO
GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) §§ 710-150, 710-161; Ore. Laws 1931, c. 278, § 15 ($50,000);
Philippine Laws 1921, Act 3610, § 141 (100,000 pesos); Utah Laws 1933, c. 10, § 3 ($10,000
to $100,000, according to population).
50. 40 STAT. 969 (1918), 12 U. S. C. § 243 k (1926); CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931)
Act 1749, § 5; Del. Laws 1931, c. 52, § 64; 11 Mo. STAT. ANNb. (1932) § 5463; N. J.
Comp. STAT. (1910) p. 5658; N. M. STAT. AxNw. (Courtright, 1929) § 13-305; N. Y. BAN K-
INo LAW (1914) § 106; OKLA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) § 9223; VT. PUBLIC LAWs (Proposed
Revision, 1933) § 6436; Wis. STAT. (1931) § 223.03 (8). In most of these states discretion
is left in the appointing court to require bond despite the general exemption.
51. Yet other jurisdictions have not thought that such exemption makes necessary spe-
cial protection for cestuis of court trusts. FLA. CoMP. LAWS (1927) § 6130; ILL. REV. STAT.
(Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 32, § 289; Omro GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 710-161; S. C. Civ.
CODE (1932) § 7865.
52. 40 STAT. 969 (1918), 12 U. S. C. § 248 k (1926) (must conform to state laws);
CAL. GitN. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act 652, § 96 ($50,000 to'$100,000, according to popula-
tion); 11 Mo. STAT. AwN. (1932) § 5463 ($2c0,000); N. J. CoIP. STAT. (Supp. 1924)
§§ 17-43b, 221-9 (5% of trust liabilities; appointments by will not protected); N. M.
STAT. Amq. (Courtright, 1929) § 13-305 ($10,000 to $200,000, as auditor may direct);
iVs. STAT. (1931) § 223.02.
efit, or even in all the assets of the bank. 3  While it is true that the benefi-
ciaries of court trusts are not free to bargain with the bank for special security
and so should perhaps be accorded some legislative protection,"4 many of the
foregoing statutes carry such protection to an extreme incompatible with full
justice to other creditors.
A cestui, court or private, whose claim is not satisfied by recourse to his own
trust res and for whom sufficient special security is not available, may claim in
the bank's other assets only as a general creditor,a unless the bank has mingled
the trust res with its own funds. In the latter event, however, the cestui, if he
is able to "trace" his property or its derivative into the assets in the hands of
the receiver, may claim a preference equal to its value.56 But because of the
rapid flux of modem banking operations, an actual tracing of trust property is
rarely possible, and rigid enforcement of the requirement would preclude the
granting of many priorities.57 Accordingly, the requirement has been tempered
by the interjection of fictitious presumptions of amazing variety.s The most
53. Del. Laws 1931, c. 52, § 64; N. Y. BAN=G LAW (1914) § 188-8; also CoNN. GEN.
STAT. (1930) § 3S85, if the language "the assets ...of such corporation shall be held as
security . . ." is to be interpreted as conferring a priority. Louisiana has enacted that
"the capital stock as paid in shall be taken .. . as security .. ."' LA. GN. STAT. (Dart,
1932) § 533. So also VT. PuB. LAws (Proposed Revision, 1933) § 6436 (Surplus and stock-
holders' liability included). The assets subject to this preference, if these statutes are to be
so construed, are left in doubt. Cf. notes 46 and 47, supra. Note that apparently no ex-
emption from giving bond is granted in either Louisiana or Vermont. Young v. Teutonia
Bank and Trust Co., 134 La. 879, 64 So. 806 (1914); VT. PUB. LAWs, supra.
54. Madison Trust Co. v. Carnegie Trust Co., 152 N. Y. Supp. 517 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't, 1915). However, even if able to bargain for additional security, court trust cestuis
would probably seldom do so. Moreover, in some states, banks are' forbidden to give
such protection. E.g., Ind. Acts. 1933, c. 40, § 179. And other states force the bank to
give a bond not otherwise required, if a party in interest requests it. E.g., Md. Laws 1933,
c. 546, § 1.
55. In re Administration of trust department, 16 Pa. D. & C. 567 (1931). Presumably
on the basis of the balance of his claim. The point seems not to have been litigated where
unmingled trust funds are concerned. Cf. note 67, infra.
56. Theoretically this is not a priority, but a recapture of specific physical property
belonging to the trust estate. Poisson v. Williams, 15 F. (2d) 582 (E. D. N. C. 1926); State
v. Farmers' State Bank of Polk, supra note 41.
57. Nevertheless, several courts refuse priority unless the tracing is accomplished in strict
conformity with logic and reality. Young v. Teutonia Bank & Trust Co., supra note 53;
First & Citizens' National Bank v. Corporation Commission, 201 N. C. 381, 160 S. E. 360
(1931) ; In re Lebanon Trust & Safe Deposit Bank's Estate, 166 PL. 604, 31 Atl. 334 (1895).
The decisions in the first two of these cases may have been influenced by the fact that the
bank was under bond to fulfill the particular trust obligations sued upon. Relaxation of the
rules would merely have diminished the loss of the surety. The First & Citizens' National
Bank case is no longer law in North Carolina, unless th erule laid down in Flack v. Hood,
204 N. C. 337, 168 S. E. 520 (1933), applies only to private trusts, which is unlikely. See
note 65, infra.
58. The fallacy in tracing presumptions is discussed in a Note (1932) 30 MIcH. L. REv.
441. Courts are not always conscious of their use of these presumptions, but the results
which they reach can be rationalized in no other way without departing from the
tracing theories to which they all pay lip service.
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common and the mildest presumption is that, when the bank withdraws a por-
tion of a particular mingled fund containing both property belonging to the
bank and property belonging to a trust estate, it draws out and uses its own
property first. The indulgence of this presumption gives the cestui a priority
in a sum equal to the lowest amount to which the specific mingled fund was at
any time reduced.- 9 The next in the hierarchy of presumptions assumes that
the mingled fund was never reduced to an amount less than that obtaining
when the receiver took possession. 60 To reenforce these two presumptions
there can be added a third, that when the bank depletes a fund containing
trust property, it transfers the proceeds to its vaults or sets apart there an
equivalent sum in trust.61 A fourth presumption enables the cestui to reach as-
sets outside his own banking house, it being presumed that, when the bank de-
pletes a fund containing trust property, it transfers the proceeds into one of
its liquid cash funds, such as an account with a correspondent bank, or ear-
marks as a trust fund a portion of one of those accounts.62  And finally, it may
be presumed that when the bank depleted a fund containing trust property it
invested the proceeds in securities now in the hands of the receiver or in loans
which have proved collectible.63 If this presumption is used, bonds in portfolio
59. Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. D. 696 (1880); Bank Commissioners v. Security
Trust Co., supra note 6; Smith v. Fuller, 86 Ohio St. 57, 99 N. E. 214 (1912); Emigh v.
Earling, 134 Wis. 565, 115 N. W. 128 (1908).
60. Result: priority in the whole mingled fund as it came to the hands of the receiver,
unless he can show that the fund at some time fell below the amount of the trust funds
mingled therein; that is, the burden of evidence is on the receiver to establish that fact.
Hammons v. National Surety Co., 36 Ariz. 459, 287 Pac. 292 (1930); Chapman v. First
National Bank of Sipe Springs, 275 S. W. 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Lusk Development
Co. v. Giinther, 32 Wyo. 294, 232 Pac. 518 (1925). If the receiver succeeds in rebutting
this presumption, the gap can be filled by another, viz: that the subsequent replenishment
of the mingled fund was intended by the bank as a restoration of the trust funds. Myers
v. Matusek, supra note 36. Some precedent for such a presumption exists in several other
states, although it has not yet been applied to cases involving corporate fiduciaries. United
National Bank of Troy v. Weatherby, 70 App. Div. 279, 75 N. Y. Supp. 3 (3d Dep't
1902); Garst v. Canfield, 44 R. 1. 220, 116 Atl. 482 (1922).
61. Result: priority in the cash in vault, even though the trust moneys were originally
mingled with deposits at correspondent banks or used to buy securities now dissipated.
Bank of America National Trust Association v. California Savings Bank, 22 P. (2d) 704
(Cal. 1933) (conclusive presumption). Another form of this presumption assumes that
when a bank wrongfully leaves trust money mingled with its own in the form of a balance
due it from a correspondent, it sets aside an equivalent sum in its own vault in trust.
Schumacher v. Harriett, 52 F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); Tucker v. Newcomb, 67 F
(2d) 177 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
62. County Commissioners v. Page, 163 Md. 619, 164 Atl. 182 (1933); Reichert v.
United Savings Bank, 255 Mich. 685, 239 N. W. 393 (1931); School District No. 62 v.
Schramm, supra note 35 (conclusive presumption).
63. First State Trust & Savings Co. v. Therrell, 138 So. 733 (Fla. 1932); Eastman v.
Farmers' State Bank of Olivia, 175 Minn. 336, 221 N. W. 236 (1928) ; Porterfield v. Farmers'
Exchange Bank of Gallatin, 327 Mo. 640, 37 S. W. (2d) 936 (1931). Sometimes this pre-
sumption is indulged only if the bank had authority to invest the particular trust funds
and accounts receivable are subjected to the cestui's priority. These various
presumptions thus render available to the satisfaction of trust claims all of the
bank's assets which the court is willing to devote to them.3 4 Courts in some
states, moreover, have abandoned the maze of tracing presumptions and have
awarded cestuis of wrongfully mingled trust funds an equitable lien upon the
bank's entire estate in all cases; and this without the aid of legislation. 65
Massachusetts has reached this result by resorting to liberal interpretation of a
segregation statute. 6 The degree of priority which cestuis of wrongfully mingled
funds enjoy over commercial and savings depositors thus varies greatly from
state to state depending upon the type of presumption or lien employed. Once
established, however, that priority probably ranks ahead of any preference
accorded commercial or savings depositors in their own assets, since trust
moneys, even when identified only with the aid of presumptions, are not re-
garded as assets of the bank.
67
A different problem arises when a bank's intermingling of trust funds with
its own is authorized, either by law or by the terms of the trust, and hence is
not wrongful. Most states, ignoring the dangers inherent in permitting banks
thus to act in dual capacities,68 hold that when trust funds are legally deposited
claimed, or is rejected where the securities or accounts were acquired prior to the mingling
and depletion of the trust moneys. In re Receivership American Savings Bank of Marengo,
210 Iowa 568, 231 N. W. 311 (1930).
64. In any given jurisdiction the same presumptions are used for the benefit of all
cestuis, regardless of the nature of their trust. First State Trust and Savings Co. v.
Therrell, supra note 63 (escrow, agency, private trust deed, court trust); cf. Poisson v.
Williams, supra note 56 (deed of trust), with First National Bank of Forsyth v. Fidelity
& Deposit Co., supra note 35 (trust ex maleficio). But in Pennsylvania trusts ex maleficio
and converted bailments enjoy the use of presumptions denied to trust department cestuis.
Mehler's Appeal, 310 Pa. 25, 164 Atl. 619 (1932); In re Conneautville Bank's Assigned
Estate, 280 Pa. 545, 124 Atl. 745 (1924). No good reason for this discrimination is given.
Daniel and Temin, Problem of Mingled Trust Funds in Bank Liquidation§ in Pennsylvania
(1933) 7 TEmr. L. Q. 160.
65. People v. Bates, 351 Ill. 439, 184 N. E. 597 (1933); State v. Farmers' State Bank of
Polk, supra note 41; First National Bank & Trust Co. of Asheville v. Hood, 204 N. C. 351,
163 S. E. 528 (1933); McKeon v. Meade County Bank, 37 S. D. 100, 156 N. W. 795 (1916).
66. Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 172, § 54; Morrison v. Lawrence Trust Co.,
186 N. E. 54 (Mass. 1933). Eight other states have practically identical statutes, all supra
note 40; yet tracing is required in at least three of them. In re Receivership American
Savings Bank of Marengo; Porterfield v. Farmers' Exchange Bank of Gallatin, both supra
note 63; Lusk Development Co. v. Giinther, supra note 60.
67. State v. Farmers' State Bank of Polk, supra note 41. Sometimes priority is denied
unless the cestui succeeds in tracing his res into a fund sufficiently large to pay in full
all the trust moneys mingled therein. Reichert v. Fidelity Bank and Trust Co., supra note
5; Emigh v. Earling, supra note 59. Cestuis who have failed to trace their funds share
as general creditors. Commonwealth v. Tradesmen's Trust Co. (No. 1), 250 Pa. 372, 95
AtI. 574 (1915); McKeon v. Meade County Bank, supra note 65. And on the basis of
the balance of their claims. Skinner v. Porter, supra note 37.
63. For an appraisal of the risks attendant upon the practice of corporate self-deposit,
see Note (1931) 44 HaRv. L. REv. 1284; Note (1933) 31 MIcH. L. REv. 532.
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in the savings or commercial departments, the trust estate becomes an ordinary
creditor thereof;09 thus the bank apparently becomes trustee of its own contrac-
tual obligation. 70 But in a few states the cestuis of such funds receive the
same priorities in special assets and the same tracing rights as if the trust
moneys had been wrongfully mingled.7' Moreover, in many jurisdictions self-
deposit by a corporate fiduciary is permitted only when securities of equal
value are set aside for the prior protection of the cestuis; 72 and some states
prohibit the practice altogether.73
The silence maintained by most courts on the question of the rights of gen-
eral creditors in the assets of a departmental bank suggests that very few such
creditors have demanded a priority in the assets of the department with which
they have dealt. The statutes of a few states, however, provide that ordinary
creditors of the savings, commercial or trust department may share the priority
which the depositors or cestuis enjoy therein.74  But the protection thus af-
69. Swan v. Children's Home Society, 67 F. (2d) 84 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933); Bassett v.
City Bank and Trust Co., 115 Conn. 1, 160 Atl. 60 (1932); Florida Bank & Trust Com-
pany of West Palm Beach v. Nichols, 135 So. 907 (Fla. 1931); In re Louisiana Savings
Bank and Safe Deposit Co., 40 La. Ann. 514, 4 So. 301 (1888); Tucker v. New Hampshire
Trust Co., 69 N. H. 187, 44 AtI. 927 (1897); Ex parte Michie, supra note 4S; Vt. Public
Acts 1933, No. 124, § 10; Note (1933) 39 W. VA. L. Q. 155; (1933) 17 Mnm. L. Rnv. 318.
70. Seutter v. Stevens, 4 F. Supp. 877 (S. D. Miss. 1933). This seems to be the most
satisfactory rationalization of these holdings, though it is contrary to orthodox trust con-
cepts. For a less plausible explanation of the absence of priority, cf. Worcester Bank &
Trust Co. v. Nordblom, 188 N. E. 492 (Mass. 1933) (bank entitled to use funds as own,
hence no presumption that it used own funds first).
71. Ind. Acts 1933, c. 40, §§ 191, 192; Flack v. Hood, supra note 57; In re Howell's
Will, 260 N. Y. Supp. 510, 511 (4th Dep't 1932) (priority the same, but procedure differ-
ent); Omo Gm. CODE (Page, Supp. 1933) § 710-165. The Ohio statute purports to give
cestuis of legally self-deposited funds even more protection than other cestuis in that state,
viz: a prior claim upon all the assets of the bank. But it has been interpreted as con-
ferring merely the right to trace the trust funds as if they had been wrongfully mingled.
University of Dayton v. Fulton, 30 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 339 (1933).
72. 40 STAT. 969 (1918), 12 U. S. C. § 248 k (1926); CAL. Gm. LAWS (Deering, 1931)
Act 652, § 105; Conn. Public Acts 1931, § 517a; FLA. Comp. LAWS (Harrison, 1927) § 6123;
IDAno CODE (1932) § 25-1503; KAx. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1931) § 9-101b; MIcH. CoaN.
LAWS (1929) § 11901, p. 4204; N. J. Comn. STAT. (Supp. 1930) § 221-7a; N. Y. BAN=G
LAw (1914) § 111; ORE. CODE Awr. (1930) § 22-1217; PA. STAT. ANm. (Purdon, Supp.
1933) tit. 7, § 819-1108; S. C. CIV. CODE (1932) § 7907; Tex. Gen. Laws 1931, c. 173;
Utah Laws 1933, c. 10, § 10; Va. Acts 1932, c. 352, § 1 (n), p. 692.
73. Morrison v. Lawrence Trust Co., supra note 66; In re Administration of Trust
Department, 9 Pa. D. & C. 702 (1927); Op. ATT'Y. GEN. (Wash. 1930) 693. Fifteen
other states have segregation statutes similar to the ones upon which these holdings were
based. In three of these, self-deposit as a permanent investment has been held legal.
In re Smith's Estate, 112 Cal. App. 680, 297 Pac. 927 (1931); Bassett v. City Bank and
Trust Co., supra note 69; McDonald v. Fulton, 125 Ohio St. 507, 182 N. E. 504 (1932)
(arose before the new statute expressly legalizing self-deposit).
74. CAL. G x. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 652, §§ 23, 27; Mcn. Coam. LAws (1929)
§ 11901, p. 4205 (trust department creditors only); ORE. CODE ANm. (1930) § 22-524 (by
forded is double edged, for it debars the creditor from asserting any claim to
any of the assets of the other departments until all the creditors of those de-
partments have been paid in full.75
Few of the policy considerations that appear to have motivated the granting
of inter-departmental priorities in the liquidation of insolvent banks withstand
analysis. There is little basis in law for the alleged belief of the average de-
positor that a deposit is a bailment or a trust rather than a loan. 76 The conten-
tion that special protection from loss occasioned by the bank's insolvency is
necessary to induce depositors to supply the funds needed by industry is per-
haps refuted by the depression phenomenon of more idle bank funds' available
for investment than there are safe loans in which to place them.7 7 Runs upon
banks will not be forestalled by providing depositors with preferences which may
increase their liquidation dividends. Nor does the furtherance of commerce
and industry require that protection be afforded to commercial deposits. The
larger portion of such deposits are created by loans and discounts, and so are
canceled upon insolvency; 78 moreover, the availability of consumer purchasing
power, iii part represented by the bank's other creditors, is more essential to
business than is the maintenance of its own current working capital. Security
accorded trust claimants merely to preserve the sanctity of fiduciary obligations
disregards the fact that such security prejudices not the bank trustee, the
wrongdoer, but its innocent creditors.
79
A more valid basis for the granting of preferences is afforded by the view
that the loss occasioned by the bank's insolvency should be made to fall with
the least severity upon the persons least able to bear it. But the many priorities
implication only); WAsHr. Rxv. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 1933) § 3244-1 (savings depart-
ment creditors only). The priority thus given to trust department creditors would appear
to extend to guaranty funds deposited with the secretary of banking for the benefit of
the bank's "trust business." See Russ Lumber Co. v. Hellman Commercial Bank, supra
note 43.
75. Russ Lumber Co. v. Hellman Commercial Bank, supra note 43.
76. The normal relation between depositor and bank is that of creditor and debtor.
In re Howell's Will, supra note 71; Pacific States Saving and Loan Co. v. Commercial
State Bank, supra note 37; TRusTs REsTATEuI.T (Am. L. Inst., 1930) Prelim. Draft No.
1, § 15 h. This is true of savings as well as commercial depositors. Kershaw v. Kimble,
65 F. (2d) 553 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933); Ward v. Johnson, 95 Ill. 215 (1880). Contra:
Tucker v. New Hampshire Trust Co., supra note 69 (savings deposits held by the bank
in trust) ; In re Cosmopolitan, Hanover and Prudential Trust Cos., supra note 5 (hybrid:
half trust, half debt). There is no particular reason why the law should be remoulded
to fulfill inarticulate and inherently unprovable popular expectations.
77. Cash reserves of national banks in 1929: $819,928,000; in 1931: $884,327,000.
REP. Cohmmn'. GEN. (1931) 1024-1025. Excess of reserves above legal requirements, Sept.
1931: $96,326,000. Id. at 702.
78. Moore and Sussman, supra note 12, at 1109 et seq.
79. Board of Fire & Water Commissioners v. Wilkinson, 119 Mich. 655, 78 N. W. 893




now granted in apparent recognition of this policy are at best clumsy and in-
exact in accomplishing its purposes. Savings deposits are not all contributed by
persons of small means; a considerable proportion of them are camouflaged
commercial accounts of corporations80 or the funds of persons having other
financial resources."' Similarly, blanket protection for all cestuis frequently
results in pampering Croesus;82 even court trust funds often consist of unearned
testamentary bounties, enjoyed by persons of affluence.8s The relation be-
tween loss-bearing ability and the amount of protection afforded could be
made closer if there were established bases of classification more discriminating
than merely whether the particular claimant is a savings depositor, commercial
depositor or cestui. A favored class could be created consisting of minors de-
prived, by death or insanity, of one or both parents; widows or widowers sup-
porting minor children; persons over sixty or sixty-five years of age; and char-
itable corporations or associations."4 Moreover, the extent of priority could be
made to vary with the size of the individual claim, it being safe to assume that
ordinarily persons with larger claims will experience less distress from a larger
percentage loss than will those with smaller claims. Finally, the extent of prior-
ity could be made to vary with the initial size of the trust estate8 5 or the pre-
vious year's average balance of the commercial account, since these would
80. Bradford, Social Aspects of Commercial Banking Theory (1933) 23 Am. EcoN. Rmv.
217. And yet persons of small means were responsible for their full share of the phenomenal
increase in savings deposits from 1922 to 1928. French, Significance of Time Deposits in
the Expansion of Bank Credit 1922-1928 (1931) 39 J. PoL. EcoN. 759. That the great
majority of savings depositors are probably persons of small means is indicated by the fact
that savings deposits in state commercial banks and trust companies in 1931 amounted to
only $328 per savings depositor. RE.P. CozMrR. GEN. (1931) 60.
81. E.g., Ex parte Michie, supra note 48 (bank president had $8,000 in savings account);
Strauss v. United States Fidelity Co., 63 F. (2d) 174 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933) ($253,000 estate
had $81,000 in savings account).
82. E.g., Lebaudy v. Carnegie Trust Co., 90 Misc. 490, 154 N. Y. Supp. 900 (Sup. Ct.
1915) (claimant had formerly been cestui for $339,000); First National Bank & Trust Co.
of Asheville v. Hood, supra note 65 (cestui was a firm which had purchased a $380,000
bond issue). The average size of private trust estates in 1931 was $56,706. RFP. CoxPTRm.
GEN. (1931) 21. Thus, even supposing that as many as five cestuis divide the proceeds
of each such trust, the average cestui would appear to be less necessitous than the aver-
age savings depositor.
83. E.g., Rottger v. First National Bank of Lafayette, 184 N. E. 267 (Ind. App. 1933)
(original size of this court trust was $90,000); City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Taylor,
163 Atl. 734 (R. I. 1933) (widow had a town mansion and two country estates in addi-
tion to a million dollar court trust). The average court trust in 1931 contained $27,800.
REP. Comn'vza. GEN. (1931) 21. Thus cestuis of court trusts seem to occupy a middle
ground between savings depositors and cestuis of private trusts.
84. Such a class would be sufficiently definite to avoid the danger of provoking excessive
litigation. It could be created without violating constitutional requirements of equal
protection of the law, for the lines of its classification would be reasonably related to the
legislative purpose. Lindsley v. Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61 (1911).
85. Claims filed on behalf of trust estates should be treated as if each person beneficially
interested therein were separately claiming his proportionate share.
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in most cases give a positive correlation with the financial strength of the
claimant. A method of distribution embodying these three bases for classifica-
tion in addition to those now recognized would more adequately spread total
loss in such a way as to reduce to a minimum the inconvenience and suffering
inherent in the liquidation of banks.
RECOGNITION OF THE HONOR DEFENSE UNDER THE
INSANITY PLEA
ONE defense in Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence which still remains
largely inchoate and almost inarticulate is that of the unwritten law.1 Despite
the sympathies of private reactions toward one who kills when actuated by
motives of honor, statutory law as a whole remains silent on the subject.
Continental Europe adopts a somewhat charitable view toward the honor kill-
ing. In France the homicide of either the wife or the adulterer is excusable
when the husband comes upon them en flagrant dilit;2 in Italy a killing for
motives of honor under such circumstances is expressly made punishable only
by sentence of from three to seven years, even though the murdered person
be wife, sister or daughter of the avenging slayer.3 But in this country Texas
alone by express statutory provision 4 classifies the offense of the husband who
kills his wife's adulterer as justifiable homicide, and then only if the latter
is surprised in the act. Georgia has reached a like result by statutory inter-
pretationo5
1. The decisions often take occasion to point out that the unwritten law is not recog-
nized as a defense. See Jackson v. State, 91 Ga. 271, 273, 18 S. E. 298, 299 (1893);
Wehenkel v. State, 116 Neb. 493, 495, 218 N. W. 137, 138 (1928); Almerigi v. State, 17
Okla. Cr. 458, 465, 18 Pac. 1094, 1096 (1920); Kell v. State, 6 P. (2d) 836, 837 (Okla.
Cr. App. 1931).
2. CODE PENAL (Carpentier, 1930) art. 324.
3. IL Nuovo ConicE PENALE (1931) art. 587. Art. 132 gives the court discretionary
power to increase or reduce the punishment of a particular offense within the limits fixed
by the law, and Art. 62 lists among extenuating circumstances the fact of having acted for
motives of special moral or social value, and having reacted when in a state of anger caused
by an unjust act of another.
4. Trx. REv. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1928) art. 1220. Under the provisions of T x. PEN.
CODE (1926) arts. 1244, 1248, repealed in 1927, adultery by the deceased with the de-
fendant's wife, or insulting words or conduct addressed to a female relative of the killer
was made adequate cause reducing the offense to manslaughter, provided that the killing
occurred as soon as the fact of the illicit relation was discovered, or upon the first meeting
of the parties after knowledge of the insult in question had been communicated to the
killer.
5. "All other instances which stand upon the same footing of reason and justice as
those enumerated shall be justifiable homicide." GA. PEN. CODE (1926) § 75. This section
has been construed to include the killing of one beginning or in the act of adultery with
the accused's wife. Gibson v. State, 161 S. E. 158 (Ga. 1931); see Daniels v. State, 162
Ga. 366, 369, 133 S. E. 866, 869 (1926).
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But the motives prompting an honor killing are likely to win sympathy
from a jury. The problem consequently becomes one of trial technique in
bringing out all circumstances calculated to mitigate the punishment. In
certain more or less recognized situations the admissibility of such evidence
presents little difficulty. It is generally true that a husband who slays his
wife's adulterer on surprising them in the unlawful act, is deemed to have
been given adequate provocation, and that proof of the circumstances is compe-
tent testimony under a charge of voluntary manslaughter. 6 The same principle
applies when the killing occurs immediately upon hearing of the marital in-
discretion if the offense is committed in the heat of passion engendered thereby.7
But when the cooling period sets in and immediate passion gives way to sober
reflection the killing becomes murder.8 In proper circumstances, even in the
absence of passion, evidence of previous marital infidelity communicated to
the accused has been admitted under a plea of self-defense to show why the
husband believed the adulterer to be the aggressor.9 Where no question of
self-defense can validly be raised, however, such evidence becomes incompetent
in mitigation of murder. 10
It is in this situation that trial lawyers have resorted to the plea of insanity
to get before a jury all circumstances of the so-called honor defense. Insanity
at the time of committing a crime" is recognized as a complete defense to
6. Logan v. State, 155 Ala. 85, 46 So. 480 (1908); State v. Yanz, 74 Conn. 177, 50
Atl. 37 (1901); see Brunson v. State, 212 Ala. 571, 572, 103 So. 664, 665 (1925); Garcia
v. People 64 Colo. 172, 176, 171 Pac. 754, 755 (1918); MIcHIE, HoMrE (1914) § 47;
1 WnARTON, CannwAr LAw (12th ed. 1932) § 426. The mere finding of the wife in
adultery is no justification where the evidence showed no heat of passion but a pre-
meditated plan by the husband to kill. People v. Gingell, 211 Cal. 532, 296 Pac. 70 (1931);
cf. State v. Imundi, 45 R. I. 318, 121 Atl. 215 (1923).
7. State v. Stewart, 278 Mo. 177, 212 S. W. 853 (1919); Hannah v. Commonwealth,
153 Va. 863, 149 S. E. 419 (1929); cf. Eden v. State, 24 Ala. App. 37, 129 So. 797 (1930)
(killing of one who insulted defendant's wife); Campbell v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 402,
11 S. W. 290 (1889) (killing of husband of accused's daughter for brutality to the daugh-
ter); McHargue v. Commonwealth, 231 Ky. 82, 21 S. W. (2d) 115 (1929) (killing of
one who had assaulted accused's brother); State v. Flory, 40 Wyo. 184, 276 Pac. 453
(1929) (killing by husband after learning of rape of his wife).
8. Brunson v. State, supra note 6, at 572, 103 So. at 665; People v. Garfalo, 207 N. Y.
141, 100 N. E. 698 (1912); cf. Rogers v. State, 117 Ala. 9, 22 So. 666 (1893); McWilliams
v. State, 178 Ala. 68, 60 So. 101 (1912).
9. Blackerby v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 832, 255 S. W. 824 (1923); cf. Boykin v.
State, 23 Ala. App. 516, 128 So. 124 (1930); Pickett v. State, 40 Okla. Cr. 289, 263 Pac.
732 (1928) (plea of self-defense in killing of seducer of accused's sister).
10. Warren v. State, 197 Ala. 313, 72 So. 624 (1916); Lee v. State, 16 Ala. App. 53,
75 So. 282 (1917); see Gafford v. State, 122 Ala. 54, 61, 25 So. 10 (1899).
11. Insanity at the time of committing the crime is to be distinguished from the
entirely distinct problem of insanity at the time of trial. In the latter case the test
usually advanced is simply that of ability to understand the proceedings or to make a
defense. People v. Maynard, 347 Ill. 422, 179 N. E. 833 (1932); State v. Murphy, 205
Iowa 1130, 217 N. W. 225 (1928); see People ex rel. Peabody v. Chanler, 133 App. Div.
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prosecution;12 and the law sets up as its standard of criminal responsibility
the artificial and nebulous test of ability to distinguish between right and
wrong,13 supplemented in a minority of jurisdictions by the further test of
irresistible impulse.' 4 -Moreover, as a consequence of at least partial disregard
of the highly technical aspects of the problem, the courts have insisted that
the issue of insanity at the time of the crime remain a matter for jury deter-
mination,15 and have allowed a wide latitude in the admissibility of evidence.' 6
Non-expert witnesses may testify as to relevant facts on the question of the
accused's state of mind, and may even express an opinion as to insanity.1 7
Eccentricities of conduct, if due to a disease of the mind,'5 the enormity of
159, 162, 117 N. Y. Supp. 322, 325 (2nd Dep't 1909), aff'd, 196 N. Y. 525, 89 N. E. 1109
(1909); Note (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 883. The test is usually fixed by statute. Cf. N. Y.
PENi. LAW (1909) § 1120. For statutes making the issue of present insanity triable by a
jury see collection in WEIHoFEN, INsANITY AS A D rENsE nN CPn=iXAL LAW (1933)
109-147. In some jurisdictions, however, it is a matter of the trial judge's discretion to
decide what form of investigation should be pursued. United States v. Chisholm, 149
Fed. 284 (C. C. S. D. Ala. 1906); Whitney v. Zerbst, 62 F. (2d) 970 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933);
State v. Detar, 125 Kan. 213, 263 Pac. 1071 (1928); State v. Genna, 163 La. 701, 112 So.
655 (1927).
12. 1 WHMRTON, op. cit. supra note 6, § 405. Provision is usually madte by statute.
See N. Y. PFN. LAW (1909) § 1120, providing that an act done by a person who is an
idiot, imbecile, or lunatic is not a crime. Statutes attempting to abolish the defense
have been held unconstitutional. State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020 (1910) ;
Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931). The same rule as to the effectiveness
of the insanity plea operates in other countries. See OPPENHEiM , CRiNAL REsFoNsI-
BIan or LuNATIcs (1909) 37-79.
13. The right and wrong test owes its modern currency to the now celebrated Opinion
of the Judges, following M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200 (1843). The historical
development of legal concepts of insanity are collected in 1 WHARTON ANuD Srii9, MEDIcAL
JUra5sPRUDENcE (5th ed. 1905) § 446 et seq.; GLuEcx, MExTAL DisoRDER AND CPr=AL
LAW (1925) 123-160.
14. Even though the defendant be able to distinguish the wrongfulness of his act,
he is excused if he is incapable of controlling the impulse to commit it. Such is the
test of irresistable impulse. See WEIIor_.u, op. cit. supra note 11, at 15, 16.
15. People v. Farmer, 194 N. Y. 251, 87 N. E. 457 (1909); People v. Whitmap, 266
N. Y. Supp. 844 (Gen. Sess. 1933); cf. Whitney v. Zerbst, supra note 11, at 972; McCully
v. State, 141 Ark. 450, 217 S. W. 453 (1920). Ordinarily evidence of insanity is intro-
duced merely under a plea of not guilty. Leonard v. State, 17 Ariz. 293, 151 Pac. 947
(1915) ; People v. Carlin, 194 N. Y. 448, 87 N. E. 805 (1909) ; People v. Joyce, 233 N. Y.
61, 134 N. E. 836 (1922). See WEloErm, op. cit. supra note 11, at 257, 258. In a
minority of jurisdictions, insanity must be specially pleaded. Bishop v. State, 17 Ala.
App. 343, 84 So. 784 (1920); Fritz v. State, 178 Ind. 463, 99 N. E. 727 (1912).
16. See 1 WaIGITO, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 228; WIHOFrFN, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 237-252.
17. State v. Cross, 72 Conn. 722, 46 Atl. 148 (1900); People v. Phipps, 268 InI. 210,
109 N. E. 25 (1915) ; State v. Schneider, 158 Wash. 504, 291 Pac. 1093 (1930) ; cf. People
v. Spencer, 179 N. Y. 408, 72 N. E. 461 (1904) (excluding expression of opinion as to
insanity).
18. Lee v. State, 30 Okla. Cr. 14, 234 Pac. 654 (1925); cf. People v. Moran, 249 N. Y.
179, 163 N. E. 553 (1928).
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the crime, the absence of motive,19 and the fact of hereditary insanity all
become evidentiary. This liberal treatment of purported evidence of lunacy
becomes an apt and convenient avenue by which to present the honor defense.
Evidence that might otherwise be inadmissible2' may be produced with the hope,
largely substantiated by the decisions, that the punishment will be mitigated.
Thus all the prior relationships between the adulterer and the accused's wife,
communicated to the accused before the killing, can be introduced to show
his state of mind.22  In most cases there is scant expectation that an acquittal
will result on the basis of a finding of insanity. In all probability no question
of insanity actually exists; the legal tests of responsibility would show the
defendant to be sane. Nevertheless, to the jury goes the evidence for its
sympathetic consideration.
One of the most striking instances of the saving function which the insanity
plea has been made to perform is that of the Remus case.23  While divorce
proceedings were pending, the defendant killed his wife. No question of im-
mediate provocation was involved; but by setting up a defense of insanity at
the time of committing the crime, the defendant was enabled to introduce
evidence of alleged marital infidelity and a conspiracy of his wife and another
man to deprive him of his property.2 4 Prosecution alienists found Remus to
be sane at the time of the killing,2 5 but a jury responsive to the evidence, and
to its prejudices, declared him not guilty because of insanity.20 Similar tactics
were invoked in the Massie trial27 in order to bring before the jury a description
of the assault on the defendant's wife, committed long before the killing of
19. Sagu v. State, 94 Tex. Cr. 14, 248 S. W. 390 (1922); cf. State v. Murphy, 205
Iowa 1130, 217 N. W. 225 (1928) (commission of other crimes evidence of present insanity).
20. 1 WiomoRE, op. cit. supra note 16, § 232; cf. Walsh v. People, 88 N. Y. 458 (1874);
Commonwealth v. Dale, 264 Pa. 362, 107 AtI. 743 (1919) (hereditary insanity is cor-
roborative evidence). Prior commitment to an insane asylum is evidence of insanity
in a trial for a crime subsequent to commitment, but is not conclusive. Whitney v. Zerbst,
supra note 11, at 972; People v. Prosser, 56 Cal. App. 454, 205 Pac. 869 (1922) ; cf. State
v. Noel, 102 N. J. L. 659, 133 AUt. 274 (1926).
21. See McCandless v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 301, 311, 185 S. W. 1100, 1104 (1916);
Choate v. Commonwealth, 176 Ky. 427, 440, 195 S. W. 1080, 1086 (1917) (mayhem on
person, of one who had debauched defendant's wife).
22. State v. Greene, 152 N. C. 835, 68 S. E. 16 (1910); State v. Herring, 118 S. C.
386, 110 S. E. 668 (1922); cf. State v. Russo, 193 Iowa 992, 188 N. W. 660 (1922) (be-
trayal of accused by the deceased); Abbott v. Commonwealth, 107 Ky. 624, 55 S. W. 196
(1900) (evidence of betrayal of accused's sister); Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 13 Atl.
809 (1888); People v. Wood, 126 N. Y. 249, 27 N. E. 362 (1891) (evidence that deceased
had raped defendant's wife) ; see Ragland v. State, 125 Ala. 12, 28, 27 So. 983, 987 (1900)
(evidence of betrayal of defendant's daughter by deceased).
23. State v. Remus, No. 29969 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1927).
24. Record in State v. Remus, supra note 23, vol. 2, pp. 42, 48, 52.
25. 5 id. at 2956, 3000, 3069.
26. Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection (1932) 42 YALE L. J.
1, 20, 22; Taft, So This Is Justice (1928) 56 WOR.D's WORK 95.
27. New York Times, April 15, 1932, 1, 4; id., April 17th, 1, 8; id., April 24th, 1, 7.
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her assailant.28 Here again no question of immediate provocation was present
in the sense of a killing in the heat of passion, and probably no question of
actual insanity. Less publicized is a recent Oklahoma case,2 9 in which the
defendant had learned of his wife's illicit relations the night before the killing.
The court specifically indicated, in sustaining a conviction for manslaughter,
that evidence of such relations was competent only on the issue of insanity,
and that the defendant should have been convicted of murder.30
Precisely what attitude should be taken toward the honor defense is largely
a matter of subjective and local feeling. The average layman, as indicated
by the verdicts of juries, probably favors its use even as interposed through
the insanity plea. On the other hand, to the legalistic mind the recognition
of honor motives, at least in the absence of statutory approval, constitutes a
sanctioning of the execution of justice by vengeful individuals rather than by
duly appointed authority, and encourages a general disregard for all law.3 ' A
recent Illinois case32 demonstrates that private justice may make its ghastly
errors. Here a father killed the alleged assailant of his seven-year-old daughter,
acting only on the child's accusation, which later proved unfounded. Under
pleas of self-defense and insanity, both apparently without merit from the
facts, he was found guilty of manslaughter by the jury, and sentenced to a
year in jail.33
But whatever the validity of the honor defense, to label it as insanity is to
confuse an already distorted legal concept. 34 Moreover, this usage greatly
complicates the issue between law and psychiatry as to the proper method for
disposing of cases involving the insane criminal. It has been widely urged
that to entrust to an inexpert jury the determination of insanity is a ludicrous
means of handling an extremely difficult problem, and that the question should
rather be subjected to scientific determination by a commission of experts.33
28. The defendant, Massie, was found guilty of manslaughter, id., April 30th, 1, 16,
but his sentence was immediately commuted. Id., May 5th, 1, 2.
29. Kell v. State, 6 P. (2d) 836 (Okla. Cr. 1931); cf. January v. State, 16 Okla. Cr.
166, 181 Pac. 514 (1919).
30. Kell v. State, supra note 29, at 837, 839.
31. See Roberts, The Unwritten Law (1922) 10 Ky. L. 1. 45; Note (1927) 71 SoL. J. 257.
32. People v. Garippo, 321 Ill. 157, 151 N. E. 584 (1926).
33. Ibid. The conviction of manslaughter was reversed on other grounds, and the case
remanded for further proceedings.
34. For the conflict between law and psychiatry as to the proper conception of in-
sanity, see generally CuuRncHr AND PETERSON, NRvous AND MENTAL DisEAsEs (9th ed. 1921)
687-689; ELLIOT, CoNFLIcTING PENAL THEORIES (1931) 22-31; GOODHEART, ESSAYS IN
JUMISPRUDENCE (1931) 46-49; JELFE E AND WHITE, DIsEAsEs or THE NERvous SYSTEM
(2d ed. 1917) 884; 1 WHARTON N STILL9, op. cit. supra note 13, § 574; Glueck, Psychzi-
attic Examination of Persons Accused of Crime (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 632.
35. CARnozo, LAW AND LITERATRt (1931) 79-109; ENsoR, CoURs AND JUDGES (1933)
89, 90; ILLINOIS CRIZM SURVEY (1929) 737-748; Report of the Institute of Criminal Law
and Criminology (1919) 10 J. Cnm. L. 186; WiTE, INSANITY AND THE Cnanal-AL LAW
(1923) 171, 271; cf. SINGER AND KROHN, INsANTY AND LAW (1924) 411-414; Glueck,
Principles of Rational Penal Code (1928) 41 HAIv. L. REV. 453.
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But while such statutory action36 should undoubtedly be supported as a method
of segregating actual psychopathic cases for expert treatment, and thus bring-
ing the law more nearly into accord with developments in the field of psychi-
atry,37 its effect would probably be to rule out the honor defense; for the
honor motive would clearly find little place in the psychiatrist's conception of
insanity. If, therefore, it is deemed desirable to retain the honor defense,
the legislation which has been suggested would, paradoxically, involve a ques-
tionable step unless there were combined with it a definite statutory sanction
of the defense in the substantive criminal law.3 It would seem that the proper
solution of the problem lies in such legislative acceptance of the unwritten
law. An open and avowed recognition of the emotional factor in criminal
trials may give rise to moral and legalistic qualms, but the result would at
least be an honest treatment of what is now tolerated through more devious
means.
36. In Louisiana a statute which attempted to make conclusive the report of a lunacy
commission on the question of an accused's insanity has been held unconstitutional, State
v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929). The Louisiana statute now designates the per-
sonnel of a permanent lunacy commission, which shall act immediately on the filing of
an insanity plea. A finding of insanity by the commission is conclusive; a finding of
sanity results in a trial of the case by a jury. LA. CODE CnM:. PROC. (1932) art. 268-270.
37. The role of the expert has been broadened somewhat by statutory provision, in
recognition of the advances of psychiatry. In Massachusetts examination by the state
department of mental diseases is required of all persons under indictment for capital
offenses, and the preparation of a report is made available to both the defense and
prosecution. MAss. A.nx. LAws (1932) v. 4, c. 123, § 100. In Wisconsin the trial judge
is empowered by statute in criminal cases to appoint experts to examine the accused, and
no defense experts may examine until the prior examination is completed. Wis. STAT.
(1931) § 357.12. The act was held constitutional in Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231
N. W. 634 (1930). In Colorado a defendant pleading insanity must be committed to a
state hospital for observation for one month. Colo. Laws 1927, c. 90, § 2. The role
of the insanity commission in New York is indicated in People v. Whitman, supra note
15, at 847, 848, in which reference to the commission is held discretionary with the trial
court. The commission's report, moreover, is held to be only evidentiary; the ultimate
determination of the issue rests with the jury. Cf. People v. McElvaine, 125 N. Y. 596,
26 N. E. 929 (1891). Provision for the appointment of the commission is made in N. Y.
CODE CRIM. PROC. (1882) § 658. It is to be composed of three disinterested persons, and
no qualifications are imposed as to their competency or expert training.
38. A somewhat analogous provision exists in Illinois where by statute under a plea
of guilty the court is directed to examine witnesses as to the "aggravation and mitigation
of the offense. ' ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 38, § 732. It was under this
section that the defense in the Loeb-Leopold case was made. See (1924) 15 J. Cnmn. L.
347-394.
COMMENTS
THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ACT
ArTERNATING turbulent' with calm stretches, the Tennessee River system flows
for twelve hundred miles from the Appalachians to the Ohio River, touching
seven states and forming a valley the size of England.2 Within its watershed,
which encompasses over 40,000 square miles, lie cities, 3 fertile tobacco lands,
worn-out farms,4 both dense and devastated forests,5 and mineral-laden moun-
tains. Vast and almost untouched deposits of coal, iron ore and limestone are
to be found within easy reach of the river; and there is also much copper, zinc,
marble, bauxite, lead and manganese.6 Despite the thirty-seven miles of
shoals, 7 known as Muscle Shoals, the river serves as an artery of commerce
for the valley; 2,000,000 tons of freight valued at $50,000,000 a year move
1. The average annual flood damage to the Tennessee Valley amounts to $1,780,000;
the 1926 flood caused damages estimated at $2,650,000. Tennessee Valley Authority (1933)
8 FORTUNE 88; TENNESSEE RIVER AND TRIBUTARIES, LETTER FRom SEcRETARY or WAR, H. R.
Doc. No. 328, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) 2.
2. The tributaries of the Tennessee River start in western Virginia and North Caro-
lina, northern Georgia, and southeastern Kentucky. The main body of the river begins
near Knoxville, Tennessee, and flows southward across northern Alabama and northeastern
Mississippi; then northward through Tennessee and Kentucky; it empties into the Ohio
River shortly before that river, in turn, flows into the Mississippi. For a description
of the Tennessee Valley, see 26 Aa c.EANA ENCYCLOPEDIA (1927) 432; Tennessee Valley
Authority, supra note 1; Kimble, The Tennessee Valley Project (1933) 9 J. oF LAND & PUB.
UTiL. ECoN. 327.
3. The leading cities are: Chattanooga, Tennessee, pop. 120,000; Knoxville, Tennessee,
pop. 106,000; Asheville, Tennessee, pop. 50,000; Paducah, Kentucky, pop. 34,000. The
total population of the valley is 2,000,000, one-half of whom are engaged in farming.
TENNESSEE RIVER AND TRIBUTARIES, supra note 1, at 1, 8.
4. As a result of unscientific farming, exhausting the soil fertility, and of uncontrolled
soil erosion, much of the farm lands of the mountainous sections, especially, have become
virtually waste regions. The typical valley farming family, consequently, has a low stand-
ard of living, surviving on as little as $100 cash a year. Lilienthal, A New National Con-
servation Policy, T. V. A. Press Release, July 18, 1933, at 2-3; T. V. A. Press Releases,
Oct. 13 and 21, 1933; Tennessee Valley Authority, supra note 1, at 88. The principal
farm products are livestock, corn, tobacco, wheat, oats, peanuts, hay, cotton and sweet
potatoes. TENNESSEE RIVER AND TRIBUTanrEs, supra note 1, at 8.
5. While dense forests, especially of chestnut, oak- and oak pine, still exist in portions
of the Tennessee Mountains, unrestrained lumber operations have deforested portions of
the valley. The problems of soil erosion and floods are intimately connected with the
destruction of these forests. Lilienthal, supra note 4, at 2-4; Tennessee Valley Authority,
supra note 1, at 88.
6. TENNESSEE RIVER AND TRIBUTARIES, supra note 1, at 8. Popular periodicals visualize
the Tennessee Valley as a potential American Ruhr. Tennessee Valley Authority, supra
note 1, at 83, 84, 86.
7. MUSCLE SHOALS Co sSIoN, M USCLE SHoALs, A PLAN FOR THE USE OF TE UNITED
STATES PROPERTIES ON = TENNESSEE RIVER BY PRIVATE INDUSTRY FOR TnE MANUFACTURE
or FERTILIZERS AND OTHER USEFUL PRODUCTS (1931) 95.
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on its upper and lower reaches.8  And even the rapids are of inestimable value
as potential sites9 for the generation of hydro-electric power.10
During the past century government officials, engineers and promoters have
visualized the development of the Tennessee River. Various schemes for turn-
ing it to uses of navigation, power development, nitrate production and national
defense were proposed, 1 but none were successfully carried into effect. One of
the most recent plans was that projected in 1916 when President Wilson, acting
under the authority of the National Defense Act,1 2 selected Muscle Shoals as
the best site for the extraction of nitrogen from the atmosphere; more than
$100,000,000 was expended on its development.13  Before this project was
completed, however, the war ended, and there followed a protracted, acrimo-
8. However, due to uncontrolled water flow, shallows and other obstructions, only
12,000 tons of freight pass Muscle Shoals each year. T. V. A. Press Release, July 16, 1933.
It is estimated that through river developments traffic by 1950 will increase to 17,800,000
tons, with an annual Saving of $22,800,000 in freight rates over rail transportation. TEN-
NESSEE RIVER AND TIBUTAIiES, supra note 1, at 11.
9. In addition to Muscle Shoals in Alabama, important shoals or rapids exist on the
upper tributaries, notably on the Clinch River (the site for the new Cove Creek Dam),
the Holston, Broad, Little Tennessee, and Hiwassee rivers. The Elk, Buffalo, and Duck
rivers, which flow into the lower part of the Tennessee, also contain valuable power sites.
10. The flow of the river at Muscle Shoals at some seasons of the year is sufficient
to produce more than 1,000,000 horse power while at its minimum flow the horsepower
is less than 100,000. It is expected that the construction of dams and storage reservoirs,
especially at Cove Creek, will equalize the flow of the river for power generation and
navigation purposes. REPORT OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGR.icuTURE AND FORESTRY
AcCO PANYING S. J. REs. 227, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922) 6.
11. The official history of the Tennessee River project dates back to 1824 when John
C. Calhoun, as Secretary of War, recommended a survey of Muscle Shoals as highly
important for the improvement of transportation in the United States. During the next
decade, as a result of a federal grant to Alabama, that state undertook the construction
of a canal system around the shoals; but insufficient appropriations for an adequate system
and for maintenance caused the canal to fall into ruins. After the Civil War congressional
interest in the navigability of the Tennessee River revived, but no effective action was
taken because Congress never approved the engineering plans necessary for a successful
transportation system. At the beginning of the present century the potentialities of Muscle
Shoals for power generation were recognized and bids were received from hydro-electric
power companies; but prior to the World War Congress took no action. MUSCLE SHOALS
Com SSIoN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 95-7; Address of Congressman Mitchell (1933) 77
CONG. R;EC. 2256; Kimble, supra note 2, at 325.
12. 39 STAT. 215 (1916). In the passage of this act, Congress recognized the fact that
nitrates, employable for human destruction, are also a necessary, but expensive, ingredient
of successful agricultural fertilizers and authorized the peace-time use of these plants for
the manufacture of fertilizers.
13. Among the improvements were Wilson Dam and two nitrate plants, No. I being an
experimental plant and No. 2 being a large cyanamid process plant. Several hydro-electric
and steam power units were also built, and also Waco Quarry, which supplied the large
quantities of limestone needed for the cyanamid process. REPORT Or SENATE CowmTrrE
ON AGRc= uRE AND FORESTRY, supra note 10, at 3.
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nious dispute over the disposition of the property.14 Contending that the
government should not compete with private business, that the government
could not profitably generate and sell electric power, that private utilities were
satisfactorily supplying the needs of the valley markets, and that its nitrate
plants were already obsolete, the congressional supporters of the Coolidge
and Hoover administrations favored the. lease or sale of Muscle Shoals to
private utility or fertilizer companies. 15 On the other hand, the progressives
in Congress, led by Senator Norris, insisted that only through public opera-
tion could the maximum use of this project and distribution of its social bene-
fits be achieved.' 6 After a decade of legislative stalematesY1 Congress has
finally, at the instance of President Roosevelt,' 8 enacted a measure which con-
templates a comprehensive development of the entire Tennessee Valley under
governmental auspices.
The Tennessee Valley Authority Act' 9 enumerates as its objectives the im-
14. Power companies, fertilizer corporations, and Henry Ford offered to purchase or
lease portions of the Muscle Shoals facilities. For descriptions of these bids and discussions
of their merits, see REPORT OF SENATE ConT=EE ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, supra
note 10, at 12-36; MINoaR=Y REPORT OF SENATE ComnTrEE ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY
TO ACCOMPANY S. J. RES. 227, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922); HEARnGS BEFORE SENATE COM-
MITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY ON MUSCLE SHOALS, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922);
HXARINGS BEFORE U. S. CONGRESS JOINT COrmITTEE ON LEASING or MUSCLE SHOALS, 69th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1926); HEARINGS BEFORE SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND FOR-
ESTRY ON THE DISPOSITION Or MUSCLE SnoAr.s, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928).
15. Veto message of President Hoover (1931) 74 CONG. REC. 7046; MINORITY REPORT
OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, supra note 14; MUSCLE SHOALS
Coi nissIoN, op. cit. supra note 7; Congressional debates on the Tennessee Valley Authority
Act, especially addresses by Congressman Goss (1933) 77 CoNG. REC. 2251, 3591, Con-
gressman Treadway (1933) 77 CONG. RwE. 2189, Congressman Eaton (1933) 77 CoNe. Rzc.
2195.
16. REPORT OF SENATE ComwlrrrrzE ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, supra note 10, at
28-36; HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE CO=ITTEE ON AGRICULTURE; AND FORESTRY ON S. J.
RFs. 15, To Create Muscle Shoals Corporation of the United States, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1932); HEARINGS 3EFORE SENATE Coarann-z= ON AGRICULTURE A FORESTRY ON S. J. 49,
Muscle Shoals, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929); Congressional debates on the Tennessee Valley
Authority Act, especially addresses by Congressman Blanton (1933) 11 CONG. REC. 3597,
Congressman Hill (1933) 77 CONG. REc. 2186, Congressman Almon (1933) 77 CoNG. REC.
2194, Congressman Taylor (1933) 77 CONG. REc. 2197, Congressman Turner (1933) 77 CoNG.
Rzc. 2248.
17. In 1928 Congress passed the Norris bill favoring government operation of Muscle
Shoals, but President Coolidge killed it by a pocket veto. Again in 1931 Congress passed
a similar measure and President Hoover vetoed it. At the latter's suggestion in his veto
message, the states of Tennessee and Alabama created a joint commission to study plans
for the disposal of Muscle Shoals; this body recommended the further development of
the Tennessee River by the federal government, but favored private rather than public
operation of the power and fertilizer units. MUSCLE SHOALS COa-uSsioN, supra note 7.
The accuracy of this report was questioned by Senator Norris. HEARINGS BEFORE T
SENATE COMM mTTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY ON S. J. RES. 15, supra note 16, at 103.
18. (1933) 77 CONG. RE C. 1423.
19. P. L. No. 32, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
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provement of navigation, control of floods, withdrawal from cultivation an
reforestation of the valley's marginal lands, agricultural and industrial develop-
ment of the district, and the furtherance of the national defense. The preamble
of the statute, possibly in anticipation of a legal dispute as to whether the
legislation comes within the constitutional grant of powers to the federal gov-
ernment, conspicuously omits all mention of hydro-electric power. Its im-
portance, however, is apparent; government generation of large quantities of
low cost electric power will benefit the region and will act as a measuring rod
for evaluating the cost of power sold by private utilities.20 But behind these pur-
poses lies an even more significant objective. President Roosevelt and his
administrators visualize this measure as the first conscious, national effort
at regional planning.21 It is hoped that through the distribution of power
to the rural and back-hill country of the Tennessee Valley the life of its
inhabitants, long considered economically and socially backward, may be ad-
vanced. 22 The formation of government towns, the construction of dwellings,
the laying out of parks, roads and recreation facilities are planned, not merely
as necessary incidentals of a large public construction project, but as experi-
mental examples to other American communities.
23
For the accomplishment of these general purposes, the Act establishes a
Tennessee Valley Authority or Corporation of which the United States is sole
stockholder; its three directors are appointed by the President with senatorial
approval for over-lapping nine-year terms. The Corporation is given generous
specific powers and may, in addition thereto, exercise whatever other powers
are necessary for the execution of its delegated functions. The statute provides
in general terms that the Corporation may be sued; and judicial precedent
2 4
20. Lilienthal, A Five-Point Program for the Electrification of America, T. V. A. Press
Release, Nov. 11, 1933, at 2-3; Statement by Lilienthal, T. V. A. Press Release, Sept. 28,
1933, at 5; Morgan, Planning in the Tennesee Valley (1933) 38 CuR. HIST. 663.
21. Lilienthal, supra note 4, at 6; Morgan, supra note 20, at 665; Statement by Morgan,
T. V. A. Press Release, Aug. 31, 1933, at 8-19. Recently, the federal government has an-
nounced plans for regional planning and development in other parts of the United States.
N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Feb. 15, 1934, at 1.
22. Lilienthal, The Electrification of the American Home, T. V. A. Press Release, Jan,
20, 1934; Lilienthal, supra note 4, at 4. To further the use of electric equipment, the
Tennessee Valley Corporation has created the Electric Home and Farm Authority. T. V. A.
Press Release, Dec. 20, 1933.
23. Draper, The T. V. A. Freeway, T. V. A. Press Release, Jan. 21, 1934; Draper, A
T. V. A. House of Three Rooms, T. V. A. Press Release, Jan. 22, 1934; Draper, The New
T. V. A. Town of Norris, Tennessee, T. V. A. Press Release, Nov. 24, 1933; Draper, Hous-
ing the Workers at Norris Dam, T. V. A. Press Release, Nov. 25, 1933.
24. Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
258 U. S. 549 (1922). The Court held that although the United States cannot be sued
in tort, an agent or instrumentality of the government which has wrongfully seized private
property may be held liable for its unlawful acts. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort
(1924) 34 YALE L. J. 1, at 22; McGuire, Government by Corporations (1928) 14 VA. L.
REv. 182; Note (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 881; Note (1924) 8 M=. L. REV. 427
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as well as the Act's legislative history25 indicate dearly that it will be liable for
both tort and contract claims.
The government-owned corporation as a device for administering public
projects is of recent origin; the Federal Land Banks, created in 1916,26 were
the first important instance. Shortly thereafter, to meet the exigencies of
the War, a number of others were established.2 7  Between the Armistice and
the stock market collapse of 1929, only two such corporations were formed,
the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks28 and the Inland Waterways Corpora-
tion. 9  But in the last four years, the device has again become prominent.
3 0
The advantages of the government corporation are that it enjoys the flexibility
of private business and is free from political interference through congressional
budgeting. 31 It must be recognized, however, that a project like the Tennessee
Valley Authority is open to sabotage by a hostile Chief Executive. For al-
though Congress has given the directors a continuing tenure of office and has
provided for dismissals by a concurrent resolution of both houses of the legis-
lature, the unqualified holding in Myers v. United States32 in favor of Presi-
dential removals is dangerous to the Authority's corporate independence.
25. The House bill placed no limitation whatever upon the suability of the Corpora-
tion, while the Senate amendment limited the suability solely to suits for the enforcement
of contracts and the defense of property. The conference committee accepted the House
provision. (1933) 77 CoNG. REc. 3560, 3564. Such changes in bill drafts and reports of
committees are important sources for the judicial determination of legislative intent. Landis,
A Note on Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43 HARv. L. R-v. 886.
26. 39 STAT. 362 (1916), 12 U. S. C. § 671 (1926). The stock of these banks, when
first set up, was primarily owned by the federal government; but gradually stock owner-
ship has, in accordance with the legislative plan, been shifted to agricultural credit co-
operatives. For a discussion of this use of the government-owned corporation, see VAN
DoRmr, GOVER NENT OwNm CORPORATIONS (1926) 16-42.
27. The principal war-time government corporations were the Emergency Fleet Cor-
poration, of which the United States Shipping Board was the majority stockholder, 39
STAT. 728 (1916), 46 U. S. C. § 810 (1926); the United States Grain Corporation, created
by Executive Order No. 2681 on the authority of the Food Control Act of 1917, 40 STAT.
276 (1917); the War Finance Corporation, 40 STAT. 506 (1918); the United States Hous-
ing Corporation, 40 STAT. 550 (1918); and the United States Spruce Production Corpora-
tion, 40 STAT. 888 (1918). For a discussion of these corporations, see VAar DOREN, op. cit.
supra note 26, at 43-197, 242-255.
2S. 42 STAT. 1454 (1923), i2 U. S. C. § 1061 (1926); VAN DoaxN, op. cit. supra note
26, at 198-205.
29. 42 STAT. 1454 (1932), 12 U S. C. § 151 (1926); VAN DoRN, op. cit. supra note 26,
at 206-226; BER AmD BEARD, THE Aw caNc LEvATHAr (1930) 380-1.
30. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 47 STAT. 5 (1932), 15 U. S. C. Supp. VI § 601
(1932); Federal Deposit Guarantee Corporation, Banking Act of 1933, P. L. No. 89, § 8,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); Home Owners' Loan Corporation, P. L. No. 64, § 4, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
31. VAN DoaRN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 258-79.
32. 272 U. S. 52 (1926). A few months ago President Roosevelt removed Commis-
sioner Humphrey from the Federal Trade Commission without a hearing or issuance of
charges, although the members of that body have, by statute, long, over-lapping tenures
of office. N. Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1933, at 24.
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Unlike the N. L R. A., 33 the Tennessee Valley Authority Act involves no
attempt at voluntary or compulsory cooperation of private capital with the
national administration; on the contrary the government is here undisguisedly
going into business in competition with private enterprise, and should the
venture prove successful, it will be at the expense of those groups that profit
through corporate financing and dividends. Attacks upon this legislation may
consequently be anticipated from a variety of sources. Though aimed at
the heart of the measure, they will probably be launched at particular aspects
deemed vulnerable. A few of such possible suits will be examined.
For the effective execution of the plan, the Corporation is empowered to
exercise the right of eminent domain, 4 this power being especially important
in the construction of Cove Creek, or Norris, dam35 and for the acquisition or
erection of a transmission system.3 6 An initial attack may accordingly come
from dissatisfied property owners, including power companies holding con-
demned transmission units. They may tie up the work by lengthy judicial
reviews of the fairness of the prices paid in the condemnation proceedings,
37
or they may contest the constitutional right of the federal government to exer-
cise eminent domain on the ground that the project does not fall within its
delegated powers. The Constitution, it is true, does not grant the federal
government authority to generate or distribute electricity. But the power
aspects of the project are so intimately related with the rest of the measure
that they probably will not be segregated by the courts for condemnation. The
generation of hydro-electric power is essential for nitrate production, which,
in turn, is indispensable to the national defense; and the disposal of surplus
power not so used to possible consumers can be proved to be necessary to
avoid unconscionable waste.38 Furthermore, a major function of the new
dams will be to equalize the flow of the river for navigation and for flood
control.39 And though flood control is not an activity specifically delegated
by the Constitution, it has long been recognized as an incident of congressional
power over navigation. 40
33. P. L. No. 90, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
34. The provision of the Fifth Amendment that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation is the constitutional recognition of the power of
eminent domain.
35. In order to equalize the flow of the river at Muscle. Shoals, both for the facilita-
tion of navigation through canals and for the more efficient development of power poten-
tialities, the Corporation is authorized to construct several additional dams on the upper
portion of the Tennessee River and its tributaries, notably at Cove Creek. Kimble, supra
note 2, at 336, 337.
36. To facilitate its power business, the Corporation may purchase, lease, or condemn
existing transmission lines or construct its own.
37. The condemnation procedure is set forth in the Act.
38. For statistical data on the waste of power and nitrate through the non-operation
of Muscle Shoals, see (1933) 77 CONG. REc. 2271-2.
39. The reforestation, essential to check the flood waters from the hills, will likewise
prevent the filling of the storage reservoirs with washed-away soil. See Morgan, The Ten-
nessee Valley Authority (1934) 38 Sci. Mo. 64; Lilienthal, supra note 4, at 4.
40. BEARD AND BEARD, op. cit. supra note 29, at 600-1. The Federal Water Power Act
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If the Corporation survives the obstacle of the Tenth Amendment,41 it is
unlikely to meet further difficulties in its exercise of eminent domain. Ample
precedent exists for resisting attack on the ground that the activities contem-
plated are not a "public purpose." 42  Eminent domain has been exercised by
the federal government to obtain sites for public buildings,43 to construct
highways for interstate commerce, 44 to establish parks and memorials, 45 and
to prevent gold hoarding.46  State use of this power has been sustained for
the transportation of oil by pipe lines,47 the transmission of messages by tele-
phone and telegraph, 48 the irrigation of arid lands,49 and land drainage.5 0  Nor
can the right of the Corporation to exercise the power of eminent domain be
defeated by a hostile state government; ever since the decision in Kohl v.
United States,51 it has been recognized that the federal government may take
private lands within the territory of a state without securing its consent. And
since both Congress and the state legislatures may legally delegate this power
to private corporations52 there should be little doubt but that it may be dele-
gated to a government-owned corporation.
of 1920 similarly provided for federal supervision of private hydro-electric projects and for
possible federal acquisition of such properties under the guise of regulating navigation.
41 STAT. 1065 (1920), 41 STAT. 1353 (1921), 16 U. S. C. §§ 797-809 (1926).
41. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
42. Eminent domain may not be exercised for a private purpose even though com-
pensation is paid. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403 (1896); Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Rr. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1897); 1 NicHOLs, E axNT
DomAiN (1917) §§ 37, 39; 1 LEwis, EamETM DomAiN (1909) § 315. But the courts
have been liberal in their interpretations of "public purpose." See Bell, Public Purpose
in Taxation and Eminent Domain (1931) 18 VA. L. Rxv. 50; 1 LEwis, op. cit. supra, § 315.
43. Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367 (1875).
44. United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513 (1883).
45. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282 (1893); United States v. Gettysburg
Electric Ry. Co., 160 U. S. 668 (1896).
46. United States v. Campbell, 5 F. Supp. 156 (S. D. N. Y. 1933), noted in (1934)
43 YALE L. J. 497.
47. West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Volcanic Oil and Coal Co., 5 W. Va. 382 (1872).
48. Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75 (1883); American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v.
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co., 202 Mo. 656 (1907).
49. Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (1896).
50. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380 (1895). Although the question whether a taking
of property by the T. V. A. is for a "public purpose" is one for judicial determination, cf.
Hairston v. Danville and Western Ry. Co., 208 U. S. 598, 606 (1908), after an affirmative
decision on that issue, the necessity for the condemnation of any specific property and
the extent to which this power shall be exercised are to be decided by its directors alone,
cf. Shoemaker v. United States, supra note 45, at 298; United States v. Gettysburg Electric
Ry. Co., supra note 45, at 685.
51. Supra note 43. Accord: California v. Central Pacific Rr. Co., 127 U. S. 1, 39 (1888);
Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Rr. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 656 (1890); Luxton v. North
River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525 (1894).
52. California v. Central Pacific Rr. Co., supra note 51; Luxton v. North River
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A second group of antagonists will be the large fertilizer companies.0 3  The
Corporation is instructed to modernize nitrate plant No. 254 and is empowered
to engage in experimentation with and production of commercial fertilizers.
In order that the expenses of this production may be low, the Authority may
use, upon payment of reasonable compensation, any necessary private
processes patented by the United States Patent Office. This provision applies
not merely to patents issued subsequently to the passage of the Act, but also
to the very important modifications already made on the Haber process of
nitrate extraction from the atmosphere. 5 Government patents are privileges
extended to inventors, and processes patented after the adoption of the Act
may consequently be subjected to the restriction in favor of the government-
owned corporation. Serious problems will arise, however, when use is made of
already patented nitrate processes. On behalf of the fertilizer companies it
may be argued that the United States government has no more right than
any private person to use a patented invention without a license from the
patentee. 6 Since the patentee acquires by his patent a legal monopoly and
since the government, if it is permitted to share in the patent, may succeed
in underselling his assignees and driving them from the market, the statutory
stipulation of compensation is, from the viewpoint of private enterprise, an
inadequate remedy. An analogy may be made to the Dartmouth College case' 7
by considering a patent privilege similar to a corporate charter and a uni-
lateral alteration in the terms of that monopoly comparable to an impair-
ment of the obligation of a contract. 8 But the arguments and precedents in
favor of this statutory provision are stronger than those against its validity.
Bridge Co., supra note 51; Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527
(1906); Union Lime Co. v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 233 U. S. 211 (1914); Mt.
Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U. S. 30 (1916);
1 LEwis, op. cit. supra note 42, § 253.
53. The National Fertilizer Association attempted to discourage the government from
entering into the fertilizer business by contending that a surplus of nitrate already eists
and that the Muscle Shoals equipment is hopelessly antiquated. See HEARINGS BEFORE
SENcAT ComuTTEE oN AGRICULTUTRE An FoREsTRY ON S. J. RES. 15, supra note 16, at
125-152.
54. The Corporation is required to keep it in readiness for possible war use.
55. For a brief description of the various processes in extracting nitrogen from the at-
mosphere, see HEnINGs BEFORE THE SENATE CoinrmTTEE ON AGBictLTURE AND FORESTRY ON
S. J. RES. 15, supra note 16, at 56; MUSCLE SxoAs CoamsissoN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 49.
56. See United States v. Burns, 12 Wall. 246, 252 (U. S. 1870); Cammeyer v. Newton,
94 U. S. 225, 235 (1876) ; James v. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356, 357 (1881) ; Hollister v. Bene-
dict & Burnham Manufacturing Co., 113 U. S. 59, 67 (1885); United States v. Palmer, 128
U. S. 262, 270 (1888); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 16 (1896).
57. 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 1819).
58. "A patent is a contract between the government or public on one side, and the
patentee upon the other side, and the same rules apply to the interpretation and construc-
tion of a patent as are applied to the construction of a contract." FISH URNE, TE PATENT
APPLICATION (1933) 3.
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All types of property,59 including choses in action,6 0 corporate franchises61
and even patents,62 may be entirely condemned under the power of eminent
domain; a fortiori it would seem that the Corporation may take over partial
use as well as complete ownership of necessary patents if compensation is paid.
This conclusion is substantiated by the governmental practice, sanctioned dur-
ing the World War, of manufacturing and using patented equipment without
the patentees' consent and relegating the owners to suits for damages against
the government. 63
The Tennessee Valley power program may likewise instigate vigorous opposi-
tion from the electric operating and holding companies in that district. The
Corporation is authorized to sell its surplus electric energy, but is instructed
to give preference to municipal and consumers' cooperative power systems over
private utilities. Moreover, among the accounting provisions of the statute
there is a section that may prove embarrassing to the utilities. The Authority
is to allocate the costs of its construction work among the items of national
defense, navigation, flood control, agricultural development and power genera-
tion. This attempt at cost accounting will serve as a determinant of the public
power costs against which to measure private utility rates throughout the
country.6 4  And the manipulation of these joint costs may result in a lower
figure for power than private enterprise would wish. Already the Corporation
has entered into a power contract with a Mississippi town at rates much
below those the community formerly paid.6 5 In their struggle for survival
the valley electric companies may contend that such destruction of their busi-
ness by government price-cutting is as much a deprivation of property without
due process of law6" as is a prohibition against the continuance of business, 67
59. See Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain (1931) 41 YALE L. J.
221; 2 Lawis, op. cit. supra note 42, § 411; 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 42, § 20.
60. 2 Lw-s, op. cit. supra note 42, § 413.
61. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685 (1897); Offield v. New
York, New Haven and Hartford Rr. Co., 203 U. S. 372 (1906); Kennebec Water District v.
Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 242, 52 Atl. 774, 778 (1902); 2 LFwis, op. cit. supra note 42, § 413.
62. 1 Nicuor.s, op. cit. supra note 42, § 20; Fenning, Patent Infringement by the Gov-
ernment (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 773.
63. The Naval Appropriation Act of 1918 provided that "Whenever an invention de-
scribed in and covered by a patent of the United States shall hereafter be used or manu-
factured by or for the United States without license of the owner thereof, or lawful right
to use or manufacture the same, such owner's remedy shall be by suit against the United
States in the Court of Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation
for such use and manufacture." 40 STAT. 705 (1918).
64. See note 20, supra.
65. It is estimated that the city, Tupelo, Mississippi, will save 60% of its previous
power costs. T. V. A. Press Releases, Nov. 7 and 15, 1933.
66. This same argument can also be made by the fertilizer companies, if the nitrate di-
vision of the Tennessee Valley Corporation succeeds in producing cheap commercial fer-
tilizers.
67. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U. S. 262 (1932).
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its encumbrance by arbitrary regulations,68 or the fixing of confiscatory rates.0 9
The precise issue has never been presented to the Supreme Court, but the
previous expansions of government into business fields have unavoidably re-
sulted in losses to private capital. The creation of the parcel post system in
1912 virtually drove the express companies out of the business of carrying
small packages; the establishment of the postal savings system in 1910 cut
into the profits of banks; the barge lines of the Inland Waterways Corporation
have impinged upon the freight business of the mid-western railroads; prior to
the sale of its fleet, the United States Shipping Board was in active competition
with privately owned merchant marines; 70 and, in the absence of state statutes
to the contrary, municipalities have been allowed to compete with private elec-
tric and street railway companies, frequently to the financial loss of the latter.71
The nearest approach to the Tennessee Valley project that has been subjected to
judicial scrutiny was the Non-Partisan League program in North Dakota after
the World War, in which the state government undertook the operation of grain
elevators, utilities, a bank, a mortgage company, and a home building associa-
tion. The legal attack upon this program came in the form of questioning
the public purpose behind the taxation instituted to finance these projects.72
In Green v. Frasier73 the Supreme Court sustained the legislation and declared
that when a government undertakes to exert its taxing power and the issue of
the validity of its action is raised every presumption must be indulged in its
favor.
Still another source of attack upon the Act is likely to be found in the state
governments of the valley themselves. While the legislation is aimed at the
economic development of the region, presumably to the states' great benefit,
nevertheless a recrudescence of the states' rights argument, stimulated by the
necessities for new state tax revenues, by the jealousies of local politicians
and, above all, by the propaganda of the influential groups hostile to the project,
68. Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928);
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929).
69. Ottinger v. Consolidated Gas Co., 272 U. S. 576 (1926); Railroad Commission
v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 280 U. S. 145 (1929); Barnes, Federal Courts .and State Regu-
lation of Utility Rates (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 417.
70. BEaRD-Aa BEARD, op. cit. supra note 29, at 380, 387, 389, 425.
71. See, e. g., City of Seymour v. Texas Electric Service Co., 66 F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A.
5th, 1933); Economic Gas Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 168 Cal. 448, 143 Pac. 717 (1914);
Mapleton v. Iowa Public Service Co., 209 Iowa 400, 223 N. W. 476 (1929); City of Far-
mersville v. Texas-Louisiana Power Co., 55 S. W. (2d) 540 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Logan
City v. Public Utilities Commission of Utah, 72 Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961 (1928).
72. Since federal taxes are not usually allocated to special purposes but are levied to
cover the entire costs of government, and since the federal courts frown upon tax-payers'
injunction actions against the Treasury's payment of appropriations, this procedure is not
available for attacking the constitutionality of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act. Froth-
ingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
73. 253 U. S. 233 (1920); see McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation (1930) 18 CA=i.
L. REV. 137, 241; Kneir, Municipal Functions and the Law of Public Purpose (1928) 76
U. OF PA. L. REv. 824; Bell, supra note 42.
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may incite a serious conflict between the state and federal governments.
Although the Act provides for payments from the sale of power to Tennessee
and Alabama,7 4 undoubtedly as a substitute for taxes,75 the valley state govern-
ments or their local subdivisions may attempt to levy assessments against the
property or income of the Corporation. It is conceivable that justifiable cause
of grievance may arise. The Authority, by over-weighing the navigation and
defense items in its analysis of joint costs, may set a low rate for electricity
and thus reduce the income of Tennessee and Alabama from the project; and
this low price may indirectly reduce their tax returns on the profits and property
values of the private power corporations. The flooding of large areas by new
storage reservoirs and the removal of submarginal lands from cultivation may
also seriously reduce the scope of the taxing power of several county and rural
governments. Even prior to the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority
Alabama attempted to tax the United States on the surplus power sold at
Muscle Shoals by bringing suit in the Court of Claims. In that case the
Supreme Court declared that the statutory jurisdiction of the Co.urt of Claims
did not extend to tax claims and dismissed the suit without any discussion of
its merits.70 But the present Act has removed this procedural difficulty of
collecting a tax levy against the Corporation by providing that it may be sued.
This remedy may prove of little value, however; for if the Supreme Court
follows the precedents established in connection with war-time government-
owned corporations, the property of the Authority that is used for public pur-
poses will be free from local tax burdens.77 On the other hand, so extensive an
invasion of government into economic fields with the concomitant reduction of
the potential tax revenues of the other units of the federal hierarchy may induce
,the Court to reexamine the century-old problem of taxation of government
instrumentalities.
78
State interference with the Corporation's activities through their power to
regulate public utilities may prove an even more serious legal obstacle. Can
the Tennessee Valley Corporation enter the utility field without a certificate
of public convenience and necessity from the state public service commissions
or in disregard of exclusive franchises granted to private companies? The
74. Each state is to receive 5% of the gross proceeds received from the sale of power
generated in that state.
75. HEARiNGS BEFORE SENATE CommuTTEE ON A RiCuLTURE AND FoRmSTRY ON S. J-
RES. 49, supra note 16, at 7-8; Address by Congressman Hill, (1933) 77 CONG. REC. 3598.
On the value of such evidence for the judicial determination of legislative intent, see
Landis, supra note 25.
76. Alabama v. United States, 282 U. S. 502 (1931).
77. In King County v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation,
282 Fed. 950 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922), the Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a local levy upon
the corporation's shipyard property; and in United States Spruce Production Corporation v.
Lincoln County, 285 Fed. 388 (D. Ore. 1922), a federal District Court declared that the
land, forests and other property belonging to that government body are free from tax
assessments.




Act requires that the wholesale purchasers of the Corporation's power must
resell at rates fixed by the Authority's directors; and already a retail rate
schedule much below that charged by the private utilities has been announced.7
Can the state commission through their general power to fix minimum rates to
prevent destructive competition"° counteract the Corporation's policy of a wide
distribution of cheap power? The statute further anticipates the establishment
of municipal and consumers' cooperative power companies as outlets for the
Corporation's surplus power. May the states deny to these organizations
franchises or certificates of public convenience and necessity? If the Corpora-
tion is free from such state utility regulations and if it succeeds in winning
the electric market of the valley, the state governments of that part of the
country will be driven from the recognized field of power regulation. On behalf
of the states the precedent of Smythe v. Amess ' may be used; there the Supreme
Court held that the federal incorporation of a railroad company did not free
it from state rate fixing.8 2 On the other hand, state interference with the Cor-
poration's rates or power program, especially where there is undue influence by
private utility interests on the local commissions, would effectively destroy a
vital portion of the whole project. In the last analysis, the solution of this
novel issue of federal-state relations will rest upon the Court's reaction to the
government's entrance into the power business.
79. For the schedule of rates fixed by the Corporation, see T. V. A. Press Releases, Sept.
14 and 15, 1933.
80. Comment (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 114. In 'e Tennessee Electric Power Co., 2 P. U.
R. (N. S.) 4 (Tennessee Rr. & Pub. Util. Comm. 1934), a local power company sought the
state commission's approval of a contract made with the Tennessee Valley Authority,
whereby the two organizations divided the state power market between themselves; the
former was to buy power from the latter and agreed to resell at the scheduled rates of
the Authority. The commission approved the contract, but reserved the right to alter the
rate in the future, adding: "The approval of this Commission to this contract . . . is not
to be construed as an agreement to approve and maintain these rates in effect for the length
of the contract, but the Commission is of the opinion that the rates and service of every
public utility in Tennessee are subject to the regulation of the Commmission, and this
Commission cannot be deprived and denuded of its powers and duties . . . by the contract
of the parties establishing rates . . ." Id. at 7.
81. 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
82. The Union Pacific Railroad Company claimed exemption from the Nebraska statute
on the ground that it was created by Congress for the accomplishment of the national
purposes of securing the safe and speedy transportation of the mails, troops, munitions of
war and public stores of the United States. Id. at 519-22.
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